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ABSTRACT 
 
YOUNG UN KIM: Speed of CEO Dismissal: An Attribution-Based Model of  
When Boards of Directors Fire CEOs in Response to Performance Downturn 
 (Under the direction of Dr. Hugh M. O’Neill) 
This research examines the dynamics of the CEO retention and dismissal decision 
making process adopting an attribution theory perspective. Replacement of management is 
generally known as an essential element for firms experiencing performance downturn and in 
need of organizational turnaround.  However, firms vary in their speed of CEO replacement 
as a response to performance downturn, and the relationship of speed to the efficacy of 
response has not been examined. This dissertation investigates three broad research 
questions. First, how does causal reasoning based on performance feedback explain the 
variance in CEO dismissal timing? Second, do boards misattribute the cause of performance 
downturn inappropriately to the CEO? If so, what are the post-succession performance 
consequences? Last, are firms dismissed faster due to increased level of legal scrutiny in the 
post Sarbanes-Oxley era?  
While current debates about CEO dismissal have generally been dominated by 
economic and political perspectives on CEO/board relations, I argue in this paper that CEO 
dismissal may be driven by cognitive, behavioral, and symbolic reasons as well. I 
specifically examine how attributions of causality of different types of performance 
downturn affect the corporate boards’ interpretations of CEO skill and their speed of 
response action. I predict that if board of directors view downturn as being internally caused 
and permanent, then the CEO will be dismissed faster. If boards view the downturn as 
iv 
externally caused and temporary, then the boards will be less likely to dismiss the CEO or be 
late in their dismissal actions.  
Based on a sample of 376 CEO dismissal observations in 348 public US companies 
during the period 1992-2009, I find that firms with a moderate speed in CEO dismissal 
outperform those that have faster or slower speeds of dismissal, showing that the response 
time after a downgrade can be an important variable affecting firm performance. The 
analyses also provided clear support for the relationship between different types of 
performance downturn and speed of CEO dismissal. Last, results also show that the time it 
takes to fire a CEO has increased over time (slower CEO dismissals), especially after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
The decision to dismiss a CEO and select a successor is a rare, difficult, and important 
decision made by corporate boards of directors. The corporate governance scandals and 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has increased the vigilance of boards. As a consequence, CEOs of 
U.S. firms are being dismissed more frequently than ever before (Kaplan & Minton, 2006).  
Boards are likely to take action against any further damage, especially in underperforming firms 
(Boeker, 1992; Zhang, 2008). As such, CEO dismissal is seen as a typical response strategy for 
underperforming firms trying to initiate a turnaround (Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Jr., 1992; Denis 
& Denis, 1995; Kesner, 1994; O'Neill, 1986a, 1986b). Yet, this action may not be the correct 
response to the problem. 
While the assertion that CEO change is for the better has become generalized, empirical 
efforts to validate it are surprisingly sparse and have provided mixed results (Pitcher, Chreim, & 
Kisfalvi, 2000). Further, results find that CEO dismissals may not help firm performance in the 
long run or even in the short run (O'Neill, 1986b; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992; 
Wiersema, 2002). Even after three decades of research, there is still a lack of consistent and 
robust findings in explaining antecedents and consequences of CEO turnover (Kesner, 1994; 
Pitcher et al., 2000; Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella 2008). Given such inconsistencies, 
Kesner (1994) argues that there are variables and relationships between variables that need 
further development and better articulation.   
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In light of such research gaps and lack of consistent and robust findings, I set forth a 
proposition that we must look at the dynamics of the CEO dismissal process (i.e. speed of CEO 
dismissal) and approach the process from perspectives other than the ones popularly used in prior 
research (i.e. attribution theory). This is in line with the call of CEO turnover related papers that 
are approached from a longitudinal and psychometric standpoint (Pitcher et al., 2000). Thus, this 
dissertation examines how causal reasoning of performance feedback affects the speed of CEO 
dismissal and ultimately post-succession performance.  
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
This dissertation is motivated by lack of consistent results in explaining firm performance 
after a CEO is replaced (Finkelstein et al 2008). Because most prior research has focused on the 
static choice of the retention/dismissal decision, I posit that an important variable has been 
missed, which is the speed of CEO dismissal in response to performance downturn. The time it 
takes to respond to declining performance can be a significant variable in explaining post-
succession performance. Dismissals which are too early or too late may have long-term negative 
consequences (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2008).  
Such heterogeneity in fast and slow responses to downturn can be explained by many 
theories. IO economists posit that industry characteristics and competitive positions affect how 
firms can and will respond to downturn (Caves, 1984; Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; Porter, 
1985). Behavioral theorists posit that cognitive and motivational orientations affect how decision 
makers frame, formulate and attribute causes which ultimately affect behavioral responses. 
Signaling theory posit that some firms may respond because of external pressures albeit may it 
be only a short-sighted and an incorrect resolution(Spence, 1974).  Socio-political theories posit 
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that responses will be driven by power struggles and network structures (Cannella et al., 1993; 
Ocasio, 1999).   
As board of directors are individuals with cognitive limitations and driven by incentives to 
meet shareholder needs, their decisions can be limited and short sighted (Fredrickson & 
Hambrick 1988; Westphal &Fredrickson 2001). Most of the theories used in examining CEO 
dismissals were based on economic and socio-political views, I approach it from a third 
perspective – attribution theory (Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1974). Specifically, I examine how 
different types of performance feedback following performance downturn (measured as first 
analyst downgrade during a CEO’s tenure) affects response speed by corporate boards. How a 
CEO responds to a downturn would be a significant signal in the CEOs managerial skills and the 
performance following the initial downturn would be a measure that corporate boards use to 
assess the CEO.  
1.3 Research Questions Overview 
The research issue investigated in this study is how does performance feedback from firms 
incurring a downturn affect perceptions of the CEO skills and influence the ongoing choice of 
whether to fire or not. Three specific research questions are addressed to facilitate the 
investigation into this research issue. The three research questions are: 
1. How does causal reasoning based on performance feedback explain the variance in the 
speed of CEO dismissal in response to performance downturn?  
2. How does speed of CEO Dismissals in response to performance downturn affect post-
succession firm performance?  
3. Is the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 affecting speed of CEO dismissals (i.e. faster)?   
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The theoretical framework employed in this research is based on the integration of causal 
reasoning based on performance feedback and agency theory. Figure 1 offers an overview of the 
general research model employed to explore these research questions.  Although economic and 
socio-political aspects highly affect the CEO dismissal process (Finkelstein et al 2008), this 
research tries to contribute to the literature by thoroughly examining the cognitive aspects of 
corporate boards of directors.  
Figure 1.1 The General Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to address the above research questions, the study uses a research design 
employing both qualitative and quantitative data sources. To first analyze the antecedents of 
speed of CEO dismissal, I incorporate a hazard model analysis. Because my focus is on different 
responses in dismissal timing following a performance downturn, identifying the point of 
downturn is important. I use analyst forecast downgrade as the inception point of performance 
downturn. I measure the first dependent variable, speed of CEO dismissal, in terms of number of 
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months since first analyst downgrade of the CEO’s tenure. For the latent variable ‘post-
succession performance’ I examine accounting and stock based performance three years after 
CEO replacement. The analysis was conducted on a public sample of all firms over the years 
1996-2009. The sample was narrowed down to include firms which have analysts following 
them and in which there was an analyst downgrade.  
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of five additional chapters. The literature review in Chapter 
Two includes an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature in the area of CEO 
Turnover. The review will start with a general overview of the CEO dismissal process and 
review factors that affect the decision to dismiss a CEO. I will then focus on cognitive aspects 
that affect the dismissal process and time it takes to respond. Chapter Three attempts to integrate 
the socio-political variables with the attribution variables I suspect will affect speed of CEO 
dismissal. I then develop hypotheses on why the speed of response is likely to affect future firm 
performance. Chapter Four describes the methodology, measurement and data used in this study. 
Chapter Five reports the results from the interviews. Chapter Six presents results from archival 
data analysis. Finally, Chapter Seven discusses the research findings and implications of this 
project. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
 This dissertation examines the time it takes to respond to performance downturn by 
replacing the current CEO. First, an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature 
examining CEO dismissal is provided. I first give a general review of the CEO and why the CEO 
is important to the firm. Second, I review the corporate boards’ role in monitoring the CEO.  
Specific attention is given to firms that are under performance distress. Next, a more fragmented 
literature examining behavioral and cognitive aspects is reviewed. This literature provides 
evidence that firms may vary in their speed of response to performance downturn. Finally, a 
framework on attribution theory is reviewed. This perspective provides a basis to understand the 
relationship between how corporate boards’ causal reasoning of performance feedback affects 
the speed and timeliness in CEO replacement and ultimately future firm performance.  
2.1 CEO Influence on Firm Performance 
A considerable body of research has examined the CEO. The effect of the CEO, CEO 
compensation, CEO entrenchment, effective CEO characteristics and CEO turnover are all 
popular topics that have been scrutinized (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Kesner, 1994; Murphy, 1999).  
The CEO is responsible and accountable for an organizations strategy, design and 
performance (Kesner, 1994). However, empirical results examining how much the CEO really 
matters in firm performance has been mixed (Bertrand et al., 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 
2007; Haleblian & Finikelstein, 1993; Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; Waldman, RamÃ-rez, 
House, & Puranam, 2001; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). Results range from the CEO having very 
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little matter on performance to CEOs being a key determinant constituting more than half of the 
variance explained of firm performance.  Lieberson & O’Conner (1972) found that CEOs matter 
far less to corporate performance than which company s/he runs or which industry s/he is in. 
Weiner (1981) and Wasserman (2001) also find the effect of the CEO to be small. However, 
these early studies were found to be statistically limited and were critiqued. Bertrand & Schoar 
(2003) captures the sole CEO effect apart from the firm effect by examining CEOs moving from 
one firm to another. They find that CEOs differ in management styles and thus approaches to 
company growth and financial aggressiveness differ. These findings support the upper echelon 
theory that managers with different background, experience and tenure incur different strategic 
initiatives (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Hambrick et al 1996). Subsequently, to resolve the mixed 
results, moderating effects at the CEO level, firm level and industry/macro level have been 
identified(Datta et al., 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). As much of research supports the theory 
that CEOs can strategically change the firms discourse by reallocating strategic resources, 
acquiring or divesting business units, and infusing an organization with values and creating a 
culture which affects employee morale (Barnard, 1938; Schein, 1992; Selznick, 1957; Smith, 
Carson, & Alexander, 1984) it can be presumed that CEOs directly or indirectly affect 
performance. As such, the process of CEO dismissal and succession is likely to be as important 
as who the new CEO is. Also, as external parties view succession as a signal about the firm’s 
future (Beatty & Zajac, 1987), the CEO succession is a defining event for every organization 
(Carey & Ogden, 2000).  
2.2 The CEO Dismissal Process 
As the influence the CEO has on the firm is significant as mentioned above, the corporate 
boards’ decision to replace a CEO will also have an impact on the firm. Research on CEO 
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turnover has been widely conducted for decades in various fields of business such as finance, 
accounting, human resource management, organizational behavior, and strategic management. 
This dissertation focuses on CEO dismissal, a specific type of CEO turnover. 
2.2.1 Type of CEO Dismissal 
Dismissals are different from most CEO successions in which an incumbent steps down 
at an agreed-upon time, usually at the retirement age (Cannella et al., 2001; Friedman et al., 
1989). Dismissals can be defined as involuntary turnover in which boards of directors are forced 
to oust the CEO, usually because of poor performance. Resignation, even though announced as 
voluntary, if due to board influence is usually classified as CEO dismissal (Finkelstein et al 
2008).  
CEO succession can also be classified as insider succession or outsider 
succession(Carlson 1996; Cannella et al., 2001). Inside succession is defined as the successor 
originating from inside the firm and outside succession is defined as the case when the successor 
is hired from outside the firm. Differences on how the type of succession affects strategic change 
and post-succession performance have been noted. Carlson (1961) found that insiders made 
fewer changes, were compensated less, and achieved less organizational status than outsiders. 
Post-succession performance results were mixed for insider and outside succession suggesting 
other contingencies may play a role. Antecedents to inside/outside succession have also been 
examined. Dalton & Kesner (Dalton et al., 1985) find that outside succession was more likely in 
the midrange of firm performers. Top performers or very low performers were less likely to 
choose outsiders. On the other hand Furtado and Karan (Furtado et al., 1990)found that outside 
succession was higher in underperforming firms. Karaveli (2007) using a continuous measure of 
‘outsiderness’ find that the variable has no significant effect on post-succession performance.   
9 
 
To summarize, CEO turnover can be classified as voluntary/involuntary with 
inside/outside succession. This dissertation will focus on involuntary turnover, in other words 
CEO dismissal.  
2.2.2 Role of the Board of Directors in CEO Dismissal  
Even though the CEO is so crucial to the organization, the CEO is an agent in which the 
firm has hired. Subsequently, the representatives of the shareholders, whom are boards of 
directors, can remove the CEO for many reasons. They can be displeased with firm performance 
and hold the CEO accountable for those results. Or, they may simply disagree with the direction 
the CEO is pursuing. Or, they may simply want to send a signal to investors that they are 
initiating a change (Carey et al., 2000). Whichever reason, the ability to dismiss a CEO is a 
strong governance mechanism which leads the CEO to act in the interest of shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). There exists auditing 
committees which examines the performance of the CEO and sets appropriate compensations. In 
board meetings, boards have a chance to evaluate how the CEO is doing and decide whether to 
keep the current CEO and how much to compensate him/her with. Thus, the dismissal/retainment 
decision is an ongoing process with formal and informal evaluation methods.  
The role of the corporate boards has ever so increased after the corporate corruptions 
were revealed in the early 2000’s. The massive failures such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and 
HealthSouth show that the boards of directors who are gatekeepers for not only the shareholders 
but all stakeholders such as the employees, customers, and the general public did not do their job 
(Kaiser 2005).  The resulting meltdown in the financial markets led to a change in legislations 
and the enactment of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002, which is commonly referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter named SOX). 
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It is the most comprehensive federal securities legislation since the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was created in the 1930s (Brown 2006). The law intended to impact the 
function of the board by mandating it be more independent and more accountable by providing 
more information to the public investors and also abiding by certain processes. As such, it is 
suspected that boards of directors become ever so more critical in corporate monitoring and their 
evaluation of CEOs.  
2.2.3 Antecedents and Consequences of CEO Dismissal 
Of the many antecedents examined by scholars, prior firm performance and strong 
internal governance are two constructs that have been robust in explaining CEO dismissal. Weak 
firm performance is seen to increase CEO dismissal (Denis et al., 1995; Fredrickson, Hambrick, 
& Baumrin, 1988; Pitcher et al., 2000; Wiersema, 2002; Brookman & Thistle 2009). However 
reliance on different measures of prior performance lead to inconsistent findings and difference 
in percentage of variance explained.  Also, presence of other factors tend to decouple or 
moderate prior performance on succession (Cannella et al., 1993; Finkelstein et al., 1998; Zajac 
et al., 1996). For example, Fredrickson (Fredrickson et al., 1988) conclude that board’s 
expectation, attribution, allegiances, and values explain boards’ action in replacing a CEO. Even 
though poor performance is evidently not tolerated by boards, the underlying process in how 
poor performance affects decisions of firing is not fully understood. The head of the organization 
could be fired as a “scapegoating” technique to signal to the shareholders and public that the 
board is trying to fix things (Gamson & Scotch, 1964), or it could be that boards truly believe the 
CEO is unskilled to lead the firm. Also, there is evidence that not all poor performance leads to 
CEO dismissal, but that relative firm performance is more important (Bushman 2008). External 
constituents such as the labor market, the market for corporate control, and proxy fights also 
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affect turnover (Jarrel 1980). Analyst recommendations and media coverage is also seen to 
increase CEO dismissal (Wiersema & Zhang, 2008). All of these causes are not mutually 
exclusive and these can act as moderating variables as well. Table 2.1 summarizes the causes of 
CEO dismissal. Many of these variables would also explain the speed in response time of CEO 
dismissals as well.  
Table 2.1 Antecedents of CEO dismissal 
Internal Variables External Variables 
• Poor firm performance (Bankruptcy) 
• Internal governance (board of director 
size and characteristics) 
• CEO power (ownership, tenure & 
experience) 
• Succession planning & contestation 
• Investing environment 
• Market for corporate control 
• Proxy fights 
• Managerial labor markets 
• Analyst coverage and recommendation 
• Media coverage 
 
The consequences of CEO dismissals have been examined largely in three types: 1) 
accounting performance consequences, 2) stock market response, 3) level of strategic change.  
Most studies examining post-succession consequences examine accounting performance two or 
three years after succession (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Virany et al., 1992). Evidence 
indicates that succession can have a positive effect on performance(Helmich & Brown, 1972) 
and a negative effect (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996), or be inconsequential because it may often 
be a symbolic scapegoating event (Boeker, 1992; Brown, Foster, & Noreen, 1985; Gamson et al., 
1964). Inconsistencies in the findings have been attributed both to methodological problems and 
failure to investigate important variables or contingencies (Kesner, 1994). Finkelstein and 
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Hambrick (1996) claim that conditions surrounding the succession, the choice of the successor 
and characteristics of incumbent and successor and measurement of performance should be 
better acknowledged. Stock market responses to CEO dismissal have also indicated positive 
effects and negative effects. Beatty & Zajac (1987) find a negative response for change in CEO 
announcement. Others find that the market reacts heterogeneously by prior firm performance, 
CEO tenure, successor choice(Beatty et al., 1987; Friedman et al., 1989; Shen & Jr., 2003). Post-
succession strategic and structural change has received less attention. CEO change is frequently 
associated with high levels of strategic change (Carroll, 1984; Greiner & Bhambri, 1989). 
Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli (1992) find that the positive impact of succession is positively 
moderated by level of strategic reorientation and staff changes. Even with growing literature on 
the consequences of CEO change, post succession consequences are still underdeveloped and 
empirical results are inconsistent (Kesner, 1994; Pitcher 2000). Also, there should be more work 
acknowledging that CEO change may have disruptive effects on organizations (Beatty et al., 
1987; Carroll, 1984)  
2.2.4 Disruptive Effects of CEO dismissal 
Many argue that the surest route to business improvement involves CEO replacement, yet 
little guidance is available in deciding when CEOs should be replaced and who should succeed 
them (Castrogiovanni et al., 1992). The costs associated with a CEO replacement are quite high 
and should be considered when boards make the decision to fire.  
CEO dismissal can occur as an adaptive response to changing environmental conditions 
or when the CEO is not a good fit for the firm. Replacing the CEO if unskilled and is the cause 
of downturn would most surely be the correct choice. From a resource dependence perspective 
(Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978), shifts in who holds power at the firm is seen as adaptive shifts. The 
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adaptive view would predict that most CEO successions would result in positive post-succession 
performance as the firm changes in a response to make a better fit. This view assumes that the 
dismissal process is rational and that the successor is appropriate for the role.  
However, boards are bounded in their cognitive capabilities and biases may lead to 
misattributions. They are also motivated by obligation to shareholder interests, personal 
incentives and network ties. Such forces may lead to inappropriately dismissing the CEO. When 
corporate performance falters, boards frequently misdiagnose the problems, fire incumbents, and 
search for charismatic successors—often with disappointing results (Khurana, 2002). There are 
also strong forces leading to wrong selection of the successor. Internal pressures toward 
homogenization may result in considering only a subset of alternatives. Dalton & Kesner (1992) 
note that the likelihood of outside succession is low because powerful internal constituencies 
may resist change. Frequently succession is seen as admitting failure (Dyl, 1985), and outsiders 
may also be reluctant to take a job in which firm performance is in downturn (D'Aveni, 1989). 
For example, when Kodak faltered in the early 1990s, its directors fired CEO Kay Whitmore 
and, amid great fanfare, appointed then-Motorola president George Fisher. But Kodak’s 
problems stemmed from difficulties adapting to new technology—not ineffective leadership. 
Kurana 2002 says that the diagnosis of the performance downturn was wrong and the “savior” 
proved impotent, and Kodak remains a “horse-and-buggy” operation in a digital-photography 
world. Boards incur the same traps in diagnosing organizational failure as managers do.  
As there exists costs that can lead to detrimental effects for the firm, boards should 
diligently consider all costs including behavioral and cognitive pitfalls that might lead to 
ineffective firing decisions. Costs of CEO dismissal can be categorized into five types: 1) 
financial costs 2) disruption costs 3) misdiagnosis costs 4) succession fit costs 5) timing costs. 
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There exist financial costs of changing including severance pay to the former CEO and costs of 
finding a replacement. These costs may range up to several million dollars. Also, CEO change is 
highly disruptive(Virany et al., 1992) as the new CEO needs to adjust to his or her role and 
especially when employees resist change. In some cases because there is so much resistance, 
strategic reorientation with no CEO change resulted in better increased performance (Virany et 
al., 1992). Because boards do not participate in everyday activities, they are prone to 
misdiagnosing the source of downturn. Boards rely on filtered data and salient information and 
are prone to selective perception (Barker, 2005). Boards may also tend to develop self-serving 
causal interpretations and misattributions related to distinctiveness, consistency and commonality 
of the performance downturn. Such misdiagnoses will affect who to replace as the successor and 
also the timeliness in response to downturn. Many boards fire the CEO under poor firm 
performance. However, Khurana (2002) proposes that crises are often the worst times to seek 
saviors. Carroll (1984) finds that rates of organizational death increase following succession. 
Grusky (1963) further suggest that low organizational effectiveness leads to succession that 
disrupts an organization and further reduces it effectiveness leading to a vicious downward 
circle. Also because leader intentions and organizational outcomes are generally loose, 
succession may lead to insignificant or unpredictable changes in performance. Dismissal can be 
an action signaling the board is fulfilling its obligation to the interests of shareholders. Gamson 
and Scotch (1964) find a “ritual scapegoating” among succession events in sports teams. The 
performance consequences were nonexistent. However, as there are financial and disruptive 
costs to CEO dismissal, even scapegoating events would lead to some amount of performance 
downturn. Boards may use CEO change as a panacea instead of correctly diagnosing the problem 
and finding the appropriate solution while considering other actions. Subsequently, weighing the 
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costs and benefits is crucial to making an optimal decision in whether to dismiss, when to 
dismiss, and who to select as the replacement.  
2.3 Speed of CEO Dismissal  
Even though speed of response to performance downturn can be an important variable in 
explaining post-succession performance, little research has been conducted on the timing of the 
decision to dismiss a CEO.  Timing is an important variable in strategy research. Studies of 
organizational change suggest that adjustments to fit the environment need to be made in a 
timely manner but because of various cognitive, economic and socio-political constraints it is 
difficult to do so (Barr & Huff 1997; Nadkarni & Barr 2008). Barr & Huff (1997) point out 
different beliefs about cause and effect is a plausible explanation for differential timing of 
responses to environmental change. Dranikoff, Koller & Schneider (2002)studying divestitures 
also find that firms are late in their response due to inability to detect and also failure to admit 
their faults in strategic planning.   
Just as strategic change and divestiture responses vary in their timing, the decision to 
dismiss the CEO in a timely manner may vary as well. Anecdotal evidence has shown that some 
firms are faster in dismissing their CEO, whereas others fail to change the CEO even with long 
durations of underperformance (Golden & Zajac, 2001). For example, Qwest Communications 
CEO Joseph Nacchio resigned at the board’s request in June 2002. Qwest stock price had fallen 
more than 92 percent compared to July 2000.  Analysts called this case of CEO dismissal too 
little and too late.  Another example is that of PSINet, where CEO William Schrader resigned in 
May 2001 after rumors in the media that the company might file for bankruptcy. According to a 
vice president of research at Robert W. Baird & Co., “Schrader’s departure comes at least a year 
too late and he is the main culprit for the company’s fall”. On the other hand, some CEOs are 
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fired very early, even without significant performance downturn. Douglas Ivester stepped down 
as CEO of Coca-Cola after serving only two years. Wall Street Journal posed the question “So 
fast?” (McKay & Deogun, 1999). Another example is Joe Briner, CEO of Alpha Bank & Trust. 
He had reported large increases and growth during his two years of tenure but was fired soon 
after the first quarter of loss reported.1 Inter-Lakes Health CEO Roger Masse was dismissed only 
after five months on the job. 
The examples show there is wide variance in speed of CEO dismissals. Especially, how 
responsive they are to performance downturn and the actions taken are sure to affect a firms’ 
performance.  However, few scholars have acknowledged the importance in such timeliness and 
responsiveness to downturn in CEO dismissal. Thus, examining antecedents and consequences 
of early or late dismissal is novel and important. Early dismissals can protect the firm from 
further damage by an incompetent CEO and signal that the firm is pursuing a change.  Allowing 
low quality CEOs to stay in position may not leave enough room for action to revitalize a firm as 
downturn triggers a downward spiral with internal and external constituents withdrawing support 
from the firm (Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 1987; D'Aveni, 1989; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988, 
1992). However, too early a dismissal may cause unnecessary disruption and incur real costs 
when not needed. Also, it takes time for a CEO to develop competence and corporate boards 
should give sufficient time in order to accurately assess CEO skills. Sometimes change occurs 
without due regard with the need for change. Lucius Cary (1641)2 noted that “When it is not 
necessary to change, it is necessary not to change”. This passage emphasizes that there are costs 
associated with change and thus fixing a non-existing problem will be expensive. Examples of 
                                                          
1 Examples of Late Dismissals came from Ertugrul, M. & Krishnan, K. 2008. Can CEO Dismissals Be Proactive? SSRN 
eLibrary. 
2 Lucius Cary, a British statesman spoke this in Parliament, 1641. It is said to be repeated by J. F. Kennedy(1917-1963).   
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such real costs are compensating a CEO for early retirement and disruptions in culture and 
motivation of the company. Boards may be too hastened and may not utilize a decision-making 
criterion with full information. However, prior literature has mainly focused on CEO 
entrenchment and inert boards viewing most CEO dismissals as being too late. Scholars 
examining firms’ competitive action and response tendencies find that quick responders gain 
market share over the expense of slow responders (Chen et al., 1992). However, especially with 
boards being held more and more liable for organization failures, CEOs may be dismissed too 
early. Or they may be blamed unjustly for poor performance. As Useem ( 2003) points out 
“Good decisions premised on strategic thinking and followed by timely execution will give the 
board what it needs to give the investors what they deserve”. Subsequently, the speed of CEO 
dismissal decisions is an important construct to be fully examined.   
 
2.4 Cognitive Perspectives in CEO Dismissal  
Recently, we have seen the exercise of board power increase (Economist, 2004). Boards 
are exercising their latent power to make or approve critical decisions and to be more active in 
their governance of the corporation (Chaterjee et al 2003). However, boards still appear to vary 
in their effectiveness in assessing performance problems and making appropriate managerial 
changes (Useem, 2003; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). The majority of the literature portrays 
the boards of directors as rational, and CEO entrenchment has been the focal explanation of not 
dismissing the CEO in a timely manner (Boeker, 1992; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella et 
al., 1993; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
As boards of directors are comprised of individual humans they are prone to cognitive 
limitations, perceptions and biases. Most directors face competing demands for their time and 
keep carefully budgeted schedules (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace & Myles, 1986). They fail to 
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do necessary homework for understanding company problems (Lorsch 1986: 107). Individual 
level and group level cognition affect decision making. Cognitive conflicts can arise in groups 
that face interdependent and complex decision-making tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In such 
cases boards are liable to characterize issues differently and hold different opinions about what 
the appropriate responses to issues are (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). An opposite dysfunctional 
group decision making process is one of group think (Mullen & Anthony, 1994). It occurs when 
boards reach consensus without critically testing and analyzing full information, especially ones 
that contradict the majority opinion.  
Board composition and demography have been used to predict the behavioral motives 
behind CEO dismissal. Outsider-dominated boards are more likely than inside-dominated boards 
to dismiss a CEO (Boeker, 1992; Cannella et al., 1993; Weisbach, 1988). However, board 
composition does not directly reflect the actual behavior of boards and we should look more at 
the processes and mechanisms which link board decisions with performance (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Board composition has been used mainly from a socio-political approach.  Thus, an assessment 
of the boards’ ‘sense-making’ of performance and then its ‘interpretation’ of performance is 
needed (Ford, 1985; Ford & Baucus, 1987; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2006). Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan (2006) posit that board sense- making and interpretation have only rarely been 
explored, and the full range of the cognitions that likely impact dismissal decisions have not been 
elaborated.  Fredrickson (1988) and Ford (1986) also posit that variance in CEO dismissal 
decisions can be explained by examining the role of various board cognitions.  
Even though board composition and demography have been used as proxies that affect 
cognition, attribution patterns may be less influenced by governance structure than the actual 
type of performance that affects boards’ perception. Performance is a major indicator of CEO 
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efficacy and if performance is weak boards make interpretations about the problem and 
attributions to the cause of the problem.  There is much empirical support in that CEOs are fired 
when an organization performs poorly (Furtado et al., 1990; Kesner, 1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1980). However, prior firm performance explained a very low percentage of the variance 
(Fredrickson & Hambrick 1988, Finkelstien & Hambrick 1996) and different measures of prior 
low firm performance has lead to conflicting results (Pitcher et al., 2000).  
In this study, I focus on performance feedback as a mechanism which triggers corporate 
boards to find a solution. Performance feedback is a major indicator of how the CEO is doing. 
Puffer & Weintrop (1991) posit that inconsistent findings in how firm performance related to 
CEO turnover is due to insufficient attention of the type of performance indicator used by boards 
making the CEO turnover decision. Stock price performance, accounting ratios and financial 
analyst earnings targets were tested to see how board’s decision to dismiss a CEO varies. On a 
similar vein, the level of attention may vary based on the informational characteristics of 
performance of being distinctive, consistent and common. My dissertation looks not only at 
differences in stock or accounting based performance measures but of qualitative differences in 
information the performance indicator provides. Information following a downturn will be very 
informative of the CEO skills. Such performance indicators will give different feedback 
information which affects the noticing, interpreting, and attribution of the performance. Research 
on performance feedback has mostly been examined from a behavioral perspective in which 
performance history affects ones aspiration level and based on that the behavior to the response 
will differ. Prior firm performance was seen as a point of reference used to notice a problem. 
However, I posit that different types of performance information will lead to different 
attributions of causality and temporality which will cause different responses (dismissal 
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decisions). Different types of performance information give different informational cues.  The 
distinctiveness, consistency, commonality of prior firm performance give different informational 
cues and different perceptions of the information give different interpretations (Kelley 1967, 
1972, 1973, Weiner 1974). However, it is not yet known if consistent underperformance is the 
reason or if sudden downturn triggers CEO dismissal. Is it low performance relative to 
competitors or is it absolute low performance regardless of industry performance? Depending on 
the salience, frequency, and commonality of the information noticing, interpreting and 
responding to such information will differ. Thus, in some cases boards are prone to 
misattribution.  It is because salient, frequent and uncommon performance feedback will lead to 
bias for internal causes. If so, boards of directors may be prone to an attribution error in which 
CEO dismissal actions may not necessarily be the correct action.  
In addition, while there has been considerable progress in trying to incorporate cognitive 
perspectives into the CEO dismissal research, most of the research has been conceptual.  Sebora 
& Kesner (1996) posit that boards of directors are bounded rationally and the CEO dismissal and 
successor selection processes are characterized by three components: aspiration, judgment and 
justification.  Haleblian & Rajagopalan (2006) develop a three stage CEO dismissal framework. 
They look at how aspirations and board composition lead to different perceptions and 
interpretation of performance.  Though Haleblian and Rajaopalan (2006) lay out “attributions for 
performance” as a major step in interpretation to decide whether to take action to dismiss or not, 
their paper differs from my dissertation in several aspects. First, it is a conceptual paper with no 
empirical evidence. They do mention briefly but do not go into depth in theorizing each of the 
constructs of distinctiveness, consistency and commonality and how they will affect dismissal 
decisions. How performance information constructs will interact with agency constructs and 
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institutional forces is not examined. Third, the dependent variable examined is different from this 
study. They do not examine how performance information characteristics will affect timing of 
dismissal and successor choice but focus on the static decision. Last, they do not theorize on how 
cognitive dimensions will affect post-succession performance.  
2.3.1 Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory has a long history in social psychology and has started to be more 
frequently used in the business domain to explain organizational behavior.  Attribution theorists 
are concerned with the perceived causes of events and the consequences of the particular types of 
perceptions involved. The theory explains the process through which individuals assign causes 
for particular behavior or outcomes (Jaspars, Fincham, & Hewstone, 1983; Kelley, 1967; Kelley, 
1972; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1974). Most outcomes are some type of performance feedback and 
depending on such feedback, individuals will reason the causation of such performance and 
respond with an action.  
More work has been done in the micro organizational behavior (OB) and human resource 
(HR) area which use attribution theory. Barry Staw (1983) introduced that organizational 
participants use performance as a cue by which they attribute characteristics to themselves, their 
work groups and organizations. Most OB and HR scholars have looked at how managers 
perceive and explain the poor performance of subordinates (Mitchell, Green, & Wood, 1981)and 
how such attributions affect their behavior.  
In strategy literature, causal reasoning has been used to explain firm performance.  Using 
an analysis of corporate annual reports, Bettman & Weitz  (Bettman & Weitz, 1983)found self-
serving patterns of attributions in public firms. Unfavorable outcomes were attributed more to 
external, unstable, and uncontrollable causes than were favorable outcomes. Salancick and 
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Meindl (1984) find that managers strategically manipulate causal attributions to manage 
impressions of their control. Most have looked at the relationship between these attributions and 
future company performance. Ford (1985) proposed a model in which performance downturn 
characteristics, decision makers characteristics and organizational characteristics affect 
dimensions of attribution which lead to different response strategies. In this dissertation, I apply 
that model to the CEO dismissal phenomena and empirically test it. 
Thus, in this dissertation I focus on the different characteristics of performance to see if 
CEO dismissal decisions and successor choice decisions are affected by such criteria. My work 
draws heavily from Ford’s (which borrows from Kelley’s attribution model) attribution model 
but extends the model to the domain of CEO dismissal. I question whether boards are prone to 
systematic bias in the information they are evaluating. The central thesis of the current study is 
that depending on the informational characteristics of the outcome, which equal performance, 
this will affect the board’s perception and motivation to fire a CEO. If boards are prone to 
systematic bias based on informational performance characteristics they use as a metric for CEO 
evaluation which affects post-succession performance, there could be several normative 
implications for CEO dismissal decision-making. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Chapter one provided an overview of the research issue and the general model, and offered three 
specific research questions.  
1. How does causal reasoning based on performance feedback explain the variance in the 
speed of CEO dismissal in response to performance downturn?  
2. How does speed of CEO Dismissals in response to performance downturn affect post-
succession firm performance?  
3. Is the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 affecting speed of CEO dismissals (i.e. faster)?   
Chapter two reviewed literature examining the CEO dismissal process. This literature helps 
establish the domain of interest (i.e. speed of CEO dismissal) of this dissertation. Chapter two 
also reviewed the disruptive effects of CEO dismissal and how board cognition may affect sub-
optimal response time to performance downturn.  
 In this chapter I relate attribution theory to the speed of CEO dismissal and develop 
hypotheses on how different types of performance feedback following performance downturn 
affects speed of dismissal and also examine post-succession performance implications. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize on how the Sarbanes Oxley also affects the speed of dismissal and 
firm performance.  
3.1 Effects of Different Types of Performance Feedback on Speed of CEO Dismissal 
Boards of directions, as being humans, have a limited ability to process information and 
their decision making also depends on their motivations (Fisman, Khurana, & Rhodes-Kropf, 
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2005; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). Subsequently, attributions of cause of performance downturn 
are also biased due to cognitive limitations and incentive based motivations (Shen and Cannella 
2002). As such, attribution processes can be linked to schema-driven processes and motivational 
and incentive based processes (Miner, 2005).  The first type of attribution process arises because 
boards have limitations in processing information (i.e. performance feedback). They will be 
selective in attending to information and will reduce the complexity of information to find a 
satisficing solution (Cyert, 1963). Thus, they will most likely be biased to attend to more salient 
and consistent feedback information. They will also be comfortable with information relevant to 
their existing mental schema (Prahalad & Bettis 1986; Gary & Wood 2011). The second type of 
attribution process can be seen as being motivated to justify performance downturn based on 
personal benefits (Boeker, 1992; Staw et al., 1983). If there are pressures for a need to blame the 
cause of downturn or signal that action is being taken to resolve the issue, this type of attribution 
process will arise. For example, boards will be prone to take action, such as scapegoating the 
CEO, if performance downturn is distinctive leading to dissatisfied shareholders. As such, 
justification is not only an internal process in which outcomes are rationalized to oneself but is a 
process that is externally directed (Staw, 1980) as described in the impression –management 
literature (see Schlenker  1980) for a review. Thus, the two attributional processes can be viewed 
as complementary and similar antecedents explain these processes. Understanding how this 
motivational perceptual process operates is the domain of attribution theory. And, I use this 
attribution theory to explain the speed of CEO dismissal and post-succession consequences.  
Attribution theorists posit that humans are prone to systematic biases in attribution. The 
most typical bias is in the form of actor/observer differences: people involved in an action 
(actors) and responsible for such actions view things differently from people not involved 
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(observers) and not responsible. The fundamental attribution bias is the tendency to overestimate 
dispositional explanations while underestimating situational causes for others behavior (Ross, 
Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977). Managers’ tendency to attribute performance shortfalls to 
problems with the workforce rather than external conditions such as the production system is an 
example of fundamental attribution biases.  
Such misattributions arising from cognitive limitations or from incentive based 
impression management can both arise at the board level when deciding to retain or dismiss the 
CEO. Both types of attribution processes can lower the efficacy of CEO dismissal, as the 
dismissal may not be the appropriate response based on the cause of the downturn, but was 
driven out of ignorance or self-interest.  Causal attributions are influenced by the information to 
which decision makers attend (Ford, 1985)and perceptions in downturn in performance may vary 
based on the informational characteristics of the performance. There are many types of 
performance downturn such as whether the downturn was distinct or gradual. Whether downturn 
has been consistent across the years a CEO was in office and whether the downturn is common 
amongst competitors. These three dimensions are core constructs developed by attribution 
theorists and have been extensively validated in psychology (Jaspers, 1983; Kelley, 1967; 
Kelley, 1972; Kelley, 1973; Weiner, 1974). Kelley’s attribution model provides an inductive 
logic model which predicts interpretations made by decision makers. While this model is an 
individual level decision making model, the model has been proven to be applicable at the group 
level as well (Jaspars et al., 1983).  The model proposes three types of information characteristics 
which affect response time and response action. Three attributional information characteristics 
are identified: 1) distinctiveness, 2) consistency, and 3) commonality. These three information 
characteristics of the outcome, which in my study is performance downturn, affect the 
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dimensions of attributions which are 1) locus of causality, 2) permanence which then affect the 
response outcome and timing of the response outcome.  This is summarized in Figure 3.1.   
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Attributional Model of Board Response to Performance Downturn 
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3.1.1 Attributional Information Characteristics as Determinants of Causal Attributions  
Causal attributions are influenced by the information to which decision makers attend 
(Ford, 1985).  Decision makers gather and analyze information which they process to evaluate 
the cause and action of that outcome. This information processing is not unbiased and 
characteristics of the outcome, the organization, and individual decision makers affect the 
process (Ford, 1985). My main focus is on the characteristic of the outcome which is 
performance downturn. Whether decision makers attribute a performance downturn as temporary 
or permanent, internally caused downturn or externally caused downturn depends in part on the 
distinctiveness, consistency, and commonality of the downturn (Bettman et al., 1983; Ford, 
1985; Kelley, 1967).  
Distinctiveness is the extent in which the information of performance downturn is more 
salient. Keisler & Sproul (Kiesler et al., 1982b) state that people attend to and encode salient 
material – events that are unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, and sudden as having 
greater weight in the determinacy of what is remembered and how well it is organized 
(1982:556). Information salience or distinctiveness significantly biases the interpretation. The 
amount of information usage affects the interpretation of strategic issues as a loss or a gain 
(Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). Ireland, Hitt. & Bettis (Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, & de Porras, 1987) 
posit that systematic errors occur in managerial decisions and the salience of information leads to 
different perceptions.   Hambrick & Schecter (1993) find that the rate of performance downturn 
affects the chances of turnaround. A crisis situation might provide a greater sense of urgency to 
take action because the information is more distinctive. Even with the same 5% drop in sales, if 
the downturn was steady and gradual rather than abrupt the information perceived by the 
decision makers would be less distinctive. Rapid performance deterioration is more likely to 
stimulate timely search for solutions. At the individual level, high information distinctiveness 
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tends to produce attributions to internal causes in individuals and also influences assessment of 
stability as permanent (McArthur, 1972). Also, the more salient the information usage, this 
affects the interpretation of strategic issues as a gain and deems it more controllable (Thomas, 
Clark & Goia 1993), thus more likely to act on the issue. 
Consistency is the extent in which the same performance outcome(s) are observed under 
similar situations over time.  Distinctiveness looks at the magnitude in gap from prior years 
whereas consistency looks at performance volatility across the years. Consistency measures 
variance in performance across a longer period of time than distinctiveness. Several similar terms 
such as turbulence (Cameron et al 1987), dynamism (Dess & Beard 1984), instability (Cameron 
& Whetten 1983) have been used at the environment and firm level to explain fluctuation across 
time. Miles et al (1974) distinguish between the rate of change and the unpredictability of change 
positing that turbulence usually creates uncertainty. Researches on the impact of 
turbulence/inconsistency are rigidity of response, secrecy, and scapegoating of leaders (Withey 
1962:118; Staw et al 1981; Pfeffer and Leblebici 1973). Dess & Beard(1984) measured 
environmental dynamism by the dispersion about the regression line (standard error of the 
regression slope ) obtained when each dependent variable(i.e. industry sales, employment) was 
regressed on time over a certain period.  – This is considered unsystematic and unpredictable 
change.  I use this same measure at the firm level as explain further in Chapter Four.  
Whether the performance is consistently poor or good, consistency supports attribution to 
internal causes. Thus, high variance in performance (low consistency) even if average firm 
performance is high is more likely to act fast with CEO dismissal. However, (Bettman et al., 
1983; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987) posit that good jobs are attributed to CEOs and bad to the 
environment. Thus, high variance may actually increase the charismatic leadership of the CEO 
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and take credit for good jobs and blame environment for bad. Also, low consistency leads to 
more uncertainty and decision makers when liable for their actions try to act and handle 
uncertainty (Miles et al 1974).  
Commonality is the extent to which other organizations experience similar performance 
outcomes. As idiosyncratic firm performance increases commonality decreases.  Comparing 
industry median return and market industry return with firm market return. Holmstrom (1982) 
and Gibbons & Murphy (1990) derive idiosyncratic firm performance apart from common 
industry performance to test how that idiosyncratic firm performance affects decisions of 
strategic change. The industry often serves as a benchmark for evaluation of corporate 
performance (Lambert and Larcker 1985, Foster 1986:225). Controlling for industry 
performance gives the true CEO skills which impact on corporate performance.  The use of 
benchmarks or references in taking action is supported by research in decision making (Cyert & 
March 1963; Bamberger & Fiegenbaum1996). In decision-making theory, individuals may not 
have the ability to detect or assess opportunities, and thus they rely on only a few cues from 
available information when making decisions (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Camerer, 1981). 
3.1.2 Dimensions of Causal Attributions 
As decision makers structure their environments through interpretation and sense making  
they retrospectively link events to possible causes (Weick, 1995). Weiner (1979) proposed that 
each cause can be categorized along three dimensions: 1) locus of causality 2) Degree of 
permanence and 3) Controllability.  
Locus of Causality reflects the decision makers’ perception that a cause of a performance 
downturn resides in the environment or situation: an external attribution; or, in the organization, 
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an internal attribution. The significance of locus of causality is that it “tells” decision makers the 
source of a cause and where to apply corrective action (Ford, 1985).  
Degree of Permanence is a continuum ranging from temporary to permanent that 
indicates the relative duration that decision makers attach to a cause. Assessments of 
permanence, therefore, influence decision makers’ motivations to change. If the downturn in 
performance is seen as a temporary problem of oversupply than decision makers will not feel 
motivated to change.  
Figure 3.1 gives a summary of the three informational characteristics that affect decision 
maker’s perception through the dimension of causal attributions.  
Figure 3.2 Dimensions of Causal Attributions 
 
3.1.3 Responses to Causal Attributions 
Strategic responses to performance downturn can be fast/proactive or slow/reactive. The 
response outcome can be a change to an outside CEO successor or inside CEO successor. 
Depending on how decision makers attribute the cause of downturn in terms of locus of causality 
and degree of permanence the speed of response and actual outcome response will vary. If the 
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locus of causality is viewed as internal and degree of permanence as permanent, boards will 
more likely to act faster in CEO dismissal and hire an outside CEO. If boards view the 
performance downturn as external and temporary,  boards will not be likely to dismiss the CEO 
or be late in their actions and may select an inside CEO.  
High distinctiveness tends to produce attributions to internal causes in individuals and 
also influences assessment of permanence as permanent (McArthur, 1972). Also, shareholders 
will be dissatisfied more with steep performance downturn. Subsequently, boards from an 
impression management standpoint will likely respond more to steeper performance downturn 
than gradual. Thus, high distinctiveness is expected to produce external locus of causality 
leading to early response time.  
 
Hypothesis 1: High distinctiveness in downturn information following an analyst downgrade will 
increase the speed of CEO Dismissal (i.e. faster).  
 
Low consistency tends to produce attributions to external causes. Also, if performance is 
historically volatile, because decision makers have difficulty assessing if result is temporary or 
permanent they will likely follow historical precedent and attribute downturns to temporary 
causes (Porter, 1985).  Also from an impression management standpoint, someone needs to take 
the blame for consistent underperformance. Thus, high consistency is expected to lead to slower 
response time.  
 
Hypothesis 2: High consistency in downturn information following an analyst downgrade will 
decrease the speed of CEO Dismissal (i.e. slower).  
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High commonality supports attributions to external causes (Weiner 1974). There is little 
theory on how it will affect the permanence measure in psychology literature. However, if the 
downturn is common amongst all firms it is likely that firms will perceive the cause as being 
external. And if all the firms in an industry are doing poorly there is less reason to blame 
someone for it. Many previous CEO turnover studies (Weisbach 1988, Parrino 1997, DeFond 
and Park 1999) find evidence suggesting that board members filter out industry effects in 
performance measures. Others suggest that boards have difficulty in doing such and take industry 
downturn as a way to fire CEOs – even though it may not be their fault (Bushman 2010). 
Overall, high commonality is likely to be assessed as the cause being external, therefore giving 
the CEO some more time.  
 
Hypothesis 3: High commonality in downturn information following an analyst downgrade will 
decrease the speed of CEO Dismissal (i.e. slower).  
 
3.2 Consequences of Speed of CEO Dismissal on Post-Succession Firm Performance 
Charles Lucier of Booz Allen Hamilton (2008) stated that “Business has entered the era 
of the short term chief executive”. However, the time it takes for an organization to replace 
poorly –performing has not been rigorously examined nor has the consequences. Castrogiovanni 
et al (1992) argue in their conceptual paper that when to replace a CEO should vary by downturn 
stage. As downturn progresses, the credibility of the CEO decreases and dissatisfaction from 
shareholders, employees, investment analysts, and other stakeholders intensify. Subsequently, 
the need for change in action increases.  
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However, shareholders and other stakeholders should realize the costs to CEO change. 
Costs of changing include severance pay to the former CEO and disruptions incurred as a new 
CEO adjusts to his/her role accompanied by employee resistance to change. Productivity may 
downturn as employees adjust to changes prescribed by the new CEO. Uncertainties about the 
new CEO and future of the firm may increase stress and decrease employee morale. For these 
reasons, firms should not be too quick to replace their current CEOs. Miller and Friesen (1980) 
show that firms tolerating short-term performance downturn and making dramatic strategy 
changes only after long-term downturn tendencies became apparent outperform firms making 
frequent and incremental strategy changes. Similarly, replacing CEOs in response to short-term 
performance problems may in fact inadvertently penalize the firm. Khurana (2002) posit that 
crises are often the worst times to seek charismatic saviors. He posits that when corporate 
performance falters, boards frequently misdiagnose problems, fire incumbents and search for 
charismatic successors often leading to disappointing results.  
Benefits of CEO dismissals are that the new CEO will have a fresh perspective of the 
business problem and infuse appropriate change. Second, it will act as a positive signal to 
shareholders. Incumbent CEOs may not be able to strategically change the firm even if they want 
to because of myopic vision and may not have the skills needed for a turnaround. Skills needed 
for turnaround may be different from those needed to maintain performance (Castrogiovanni et 
al 1992). Chung (1987) also mentions that replacing the CEO is the most dramatic way to signal 
a willingness to change. However, such scapegoating may not help the firm if the CEO was not 
the direct cause of the downturn. Considering costs of CEO change as mentioned above, 
scapegoating should incur in negative post-succession downturn. However, as downturn 
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progresses the need for change will intensify and credibility of the CEO will decrease. Boards 
will have the need to act and blame someone.  
Most scholars view dismissal as being too late because of CEO entrenchment (Finkelstein 
et al 2008). It is likely that powerful CEOs may act opportunistically leading to 
underperformance. In such cases, even though the CEO is the cause of downturn, it would be 
difficult to fire the CEO. Even if entrenchment is not the case, keeping an unqualified CEO over 
long durations of underperformance may cause unrecoverable damage. Daveni (1988) posit that 
firms losing the time to turnaround in early stages may incur a downward spiral. In a downward 
spiral, external constituents pull out support from the firm leading to irrevocable downturn.  
Thus, balancing the costs and benefits of CEO change, there should be an optimal time in 
which CEO dismissal should occur after start of downturn.  Too early dismissals from short term 
responses without considering costs of change will lead to lower post-succession performance. 
Especially if early dismissals arise from misattributions and scapegoating as mentioned earlier 
post-succession performance will be even worse. Too late dismissals will occur mostly from 
CEO entrenchment. In such cases a downward spiral might have begun and changing the CEO 
might be too late. As such, the following hypothesis is derived:  
 
H4: Speed of CEO dismissal will have an inverted-U relationship with post-succession 
performance.  
3.3 Trend and Sarbanes-Oxley Effects on Speed of CEO Dismissal 
In wake of the corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron etc. legislation has been 
introduced in 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley act, which requires additional corporate board 
responsibilities. The legislation set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company 
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boards. Prior research shows that shifts in regulatory (Smith & Grimm 1987; Cho & Shen 2011) 
or technological environments (Tushman & Anderson 1986) motivate important strategic 
changes in organizations.  
While the CEO once dominated the boards, increasingly it is now boards that monitor 
closely CEOs performance and also engage in strategic direction making. Judge & Zeithmal 
(1992) posit board of directors’ involvement in strategic decision making has increased as an 
institutional response. As corporate boards are legal entities governed by state law, increased 
litigation has been directed at boards (Kesner & Johnson 1990). As such, boards are pressured to 
act when firms are underperforming. Growing levels of shareholder activitism leads to greater 
and faster likelihood of executives being dismissed for poor performance. Boards in general will 
attribute poor performance to internal rather than external causes, especially when they are liable 
for it (Miner 2005). The situation then begs the question of are boards just doing something or 
are they doing the right thing when dismissing CEOs? If boards are indeed getting rid of 
unskilled and entrenched CEOs post-succession performance for firms which have dismissed 
CEOs in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era will be higher. However, if the boards’ response was due to 
impatience and short-terminsm post-succession performance will be lower. The effects of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation provide contrasting predictions:  
 
H5: Speed of CEO dismissal in declining firms has increased (i.e. faster) post Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation 
 
H6a: Post-succession performance will be lower for dismissal post Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
H 6b: Post-succession performance will be higher for dismissals post Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides a description of the methodology used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter three. Accordingly, the following is organized into three sections: (1) 
sample selection process and data sources; (2) measurement of primary variables; and (3) 
overview of the statistical methods used for testing the hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Design 
 I use both qualitative and quantitative data for this study. Interviews were conducted with 
three board members serving on various corporate boards in North Carolina. The interviews 
serve the purpose of understanding the context of CEO dismissal and validate the major 
assumptions and propositions. Guided by a case-study protocol, open-ended questions were used 
in the interview. A copy of the protocol and research questions is provided in Appendix 1. Each 
interview lasts about one hour. All interviews were attended by two researchers. Notes were 
taken during the interview by both researchers and compared after interview to make sure the 
understanding and interpretation of the qualitative data is uniform. Results from the qualitative 
analysis are presented in Chapter Five.  
 The quantitative data was collected from multiple sources. The sample of firms used in 
this study includes all publicly-traded corporations that satisfy the following criteria.  
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1. The firm is included in the Execucomp database during the 1996-2009 period. 3  
2. The firm is included in the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and has 
experienced a downgrade in analyst ratings. 4   
3. Financial statement data are available on the Compustat database and return data are 
available on the CRSP database.  
4. Boards of Directors data are available on the IRRC directors (Risk Metrics) database.  
The choice of sample was dictated by the need to identify firms that are monitored by the 
investment community. Thus, the sample consists of large, publicly traded firms in the United 
States. Financial and public utility firms (SIC codes 4800-4999, 6000-6999) were excluded 
because government regulations potentially affect large shareholder ownership and influence 
corporate governance. Boards of directors’ information are typically readily available for public 
firms as provided in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirement.  
I tracked data for each sample CEO observation from the start of CEO tenure until the 
end of 2009 or until the date the CEO was dismissed. I took note of whether the CEO was 
dismissed due to bankruptcy, de-listings, buy-outs, or acquisitions. In order to assess post-
succession performance, I also collect future ROA and abnormal stock return data two and three 
years following CEO dismissal. All observations with no CEO dismissal are excluded for this 
part of the analysis.  
In order to measure time to CEO dismissal of declining firms, the start of downturn 
should be a standard measure for each firm. Because how long a duration of prior year 
                                                          
3 Execucomp is a subset of the compustat database offered by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). This database 
lists annual CEO information, including CEO turnover data during the 1992-2009 period. Because IRRC data was only 
available for the 1996-2005 period my sample is limited to that time period.  
4 The downgrade must take place after a known start date of a CEO.  
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performance information boards of directors use to evaluate their CEOs is not known, I propose 
using an external measure of downturn which is investment analyst evaluations.  
Analyst ratings of the stock of the firm (Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Underperform and Sell) 
are issued monthly. 5 Change in ratings is not frequent, especially for downgrades (Womack, 
1996), and thus can be seen as a valid inception point and measure of downturn. This assumption 
was partially validated by interviews with board members. A downgrade in rating signals that the 
investors view the firm as problematic and in need of change. As many investment analysts may 
cover a firm, I use the negative change in consensus rating as a sign of potential problems.  
Because a change in analyst ratings has significant impact on stock price and investor 
demand on the firm’s stock (Chung & Jo, 1996; Irvine, 2003; Stickel, 1992; Womack, 1996), it 
is likely that boards will use analyst forecasts as a proxy for information (Puffer et al., 1991). 
Although an uncertain signal, an analyst downgrade will bring to the attention of boards that a 
problem may exist. After such incident, boards will try to figure out the causality of the 
problem6. Thus, how the CEO reacts and resolves the issue after such downgrades is critical 
information to the board of directors and financial firm performance will be the core metric for 
evaluation. As such, I control for firm performance following the downgrade. Though not 
frequent, because there can be more than one rating downturn throughout the CEO’s tenure, I use 
the first downturn in rating since the start of the incumbent CEO tenure because it shows the first 
sign of trouble. A graphical picture is given in Figure 4.1 for clearer understanding.  
                                                          5 Security analysts’ ratings can be obtained from reports issued by individual analysts or by reports of services that collect and distribute earnings ratings made by analysts. The IBES surveys individual financial analysts from the research departments of leading Wall Street and regional brokerage firms. IBES collects not only security analyst ratings but earnings per share forecasts.  
6 Interviews with three directors serving on over fifteen corporate boards show that board members view analyst ratings seriously and use supplementary information to confirm or disconfirm the prospects and skills of the CEO conveyed by the firm’s analyst ratings.   
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Figure 4.1 Measurement of Speed of CEO Dismissal in Response to Analyst Downgrade 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Key Variables and Measures 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1-3 and 5 is the speed of dismissal. Speed of 
dismissal was measured as the time it takes to fire a CEO after the first analyst downgrade during 
one’s tenure. First, I need to identify and classify whether CEO turnover is truly a forced 
dismissal. This is a major challenge in succession research because firms seldom fully disclose 
the true reasons behind CEO resignations (Denis et al., 1995; Fredrickson et al., 1988). Recent 
work has thus used several approaches to better identify CEO dismissals and distinguish them 
from voluntary turnovers or retirement (Parrino, 1997; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Wiersema et al., 
2008). Based on such recent approaches I classify forced dismissals as all CEO changes other 
than those arising from retirement, death, illness, or those involving the CEO’s departure for a 
prestigious position elsewhere.  In assessing the nature of the CEO succession, I follow prior 
studies using age at departure. I identify from the Execucomp database whether CEOs have 
reached the retirement age of 64 years old. I assume a voluntary retirement for any departing 
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CEO at least 64 years old unless I later uncover information suggesting otherwise. Next, if the 
CEO keeps directorship or the title of chairman after retirement I do not treat the observation as a 
dismissal (Shen & Cannella 2002). Third, for the observation coded as “retired” or “unknown” 
on the Execucomp database I go through news articles from Factiva and Google search to 
uncover information behind the departure.  I consult the full article pertaining to the 
announcement of CEO departure. Also, I search articles up to two years prior to and one year 
post the CEO departure to look for words such as “poor management”, “performance problems”, 
and “board conflicts”.  Last, if the CEO departs due to bankruptcy, delistings, or acquisitions I do 
not classify the CEO as being dismissed and is not included in my sample.  After assessing the 
nature of the CEO succession, the speed of CEO dismissal is measured counting the time it takes 
to fire a CEO. Thus, the speed of dismissal is defined as the number of days between the last 
consensus stock recommendations having a downgrade until the CEO leaves the office.  
I model dismissal as a time-dependent binary event. The dependent variable is the log of 
time-to-dismissal. Facing two issues with the data, one, that there are a number of censored 
observations and two, the probability of dismissal may increase with the length of time the CEO 
has not be fired I use a hazard function to model speed of CEO dismissal . I use a parametric 
method to model the effects of independent variables on time-to-event, i.e. speed of dismissal 
(see chapter 5).  
 The dependent variable for Hypotheses 4 and 6 is post-succession firm performance. 
Table 4.1 shows the summary of measures for the depend variables of my analyses. Following 
Virany et al., 1992 and Beoker & Goodstein 1993, I explore the effects of succession on firm 
performance by measuring percentage change in industry adjusted ROA and market adjusted 
stock return between the year of succession and three years subsequent to succession. A three-
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year interval was employed to provide a time period long enough to permit changes to take 
place, but short enough not to be confounded by other factors. I also explore two-year ROA and 
stock return differences as a robustness test and find little difference. When examining post-
succession firm performance, the speed of CEO dismissal is used as the main explanatory 
variable.  
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
For hypothesis 1-3the core independent variables are different types of performance 
feedback following an analyst downgrade. I develop three measures of performance types. The 
extent of distinctiveness was measured by calculating average change in abnormal stock return 
over the period of downturn (first analyst downgrade) to CEO dismissal or until the end of my 
study (year 2009). Monthly return data is collected for all firms during that period. Average 
change in abnormal stock return is used to capture the magnitude of performance change across 
that time7.  Instead of using the slope of downturn using two time points 
                                                          
7 Because the number of months from analyst downgrade to CEO change will vary for firms, this may be confounding. 
Because early dismissal may not leave sufficient degrees of freedom the distinctiveness, consistency, and commonality  
estimates may not be robust.   
Table 4.1 Dependent Variable Definition and Measure
Variable Definition Measure Source
Speed of CEO Dismissal The time it takes for boards to respond 
to an analyst downgrade by firing the 
CEO
The log of the number of days between the last 
consensus stock recommendation having a 
downgrade until the CEO leaves the office
Compustat/
IBES
Change in Industry Adjusted 
ROA The change in industry adjusted ROA 
between the average ROA one year 
prior to CEO dismissal and the average 
three years after CEO dismissal
Industry adjusted ROA is the firm ROA less 
industry ROA, where the change in ROA is the 
twelve month average ROA before CEO dismissal 
less the 36 month average ROA following CEO 
dismissal
Compustat
Change Abnormal Stock 
Return
The change in market adjusted ROA 
between the average abnormal return 
one year prior to CEO dismissal and the 
average three years after CEO 
dismissal
Market adjusted return is the firm return less 
market return, where the change in stock return is 
the twelve month average return before CEO 
dismissal less the 36 month average return 
following CEO dismissal
CRSP
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(
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠−𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
Time
), I utilize my monthly data to obtain average change in abnormal stock 
return over the period of interest. This is equivalent to the regression slope coefficient (β) 
obtained when abnormal return is regression on time (month) over the period of downgrade to 
CEO dismissal (or end of study).  
The extent of consistency is measured by using Dess & Beard’s (Dess & Beard, 1984) 
measure of environmental dynamism at the firm level. It is measured by the dispersion about the 
regression line. This is calculated as the standard error of the regression slope coefficient 
obtained when abnormal stock return is regressed on time over the duration of first downgrade 
rating and CEO dismissal (or end of study) divided by mean value of abnormal stock return 
during the duration (𝑌 � ).  
The extent of commonality can be measured by regressing change in firm abnormal stock 
return on change in industry abnormal stock return over the duration first downgrade rating to 
CEO dismissal (or end of study). The beta coefficient of change in industry performance will 
give a continuous measure of the degree of commonality. If the beta coefficient is higher, the 
commonality is higher.  
∆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑓 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 
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Corporate governance variables were included as control variables when examining the 
antecedents of speed of dismissal. These variables were also included to run regressions for 
generating the excess time variables needed for examining performance consequences of speed 
of dismissal (see 4.3.2 section). These variables are gathered from the RiskMetrics database 
(IRRC directors). Fraction of independent (outside) board members (Weisbach 1998) is 
measured as the ratio of independent directors to board size calculated at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to analyst downgrade. Prior researchers (Cannella et al., 2001; Zajac et al., 1996) find 
that stronger boards with more independent directors increase the probability of CEO turnover. 
Board size is the number of directors on the board which was calculated at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to analyst downgrade. Prior research (Zajac et al., 1996) find that larger boards affect 
CEO turnover decisions.  CEO duality is whether the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. 
A dummy variable of 1 is given if the two positions are separated and 0 otherwise. Prior 
literature suggests that separating CEO and board chair positions give more power to the board 
of directors over the CEO (Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994). Thus, less entrenchment will increase 
the likelihood of CEO dismissal(Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). Gompers index is a measure 
Table 4.2 Independent Variable Definition and Measure
Variable Definition Measure Source
Distinctiveness Magnitude of firm performance change 
during the period of analyst downgrade 
to CEO dismissal
Beta coefficient from the regression of monthly 
stock return on time
CRSP/IBES
Consistency Volatility of firm performance during 
the period of analyst downgrade to CEO 
dismissal 
Standard error of the the beta coefficient from the 
regression of monthly stock return on time. The 
larger the standard error the less consistent the 
movement of stock return with respect to time. 
Thus, the measure itself is more a measure of 
inconsistency
CRSP/IBES
Commonality The extent of commonness of firm 
performance and industry perfomrance
Alpha coefficient from the regression of monthly 
individual stock return on monthly industry stock 
return. This measure is the portion of firm's stock 
return that is unrelated to the industry stock 
return. Thus, the measure is more a measure of 
uncommonality
CRSP/IBES
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of the level of takeover and other protection insulating the CEO from external control markets. A 
lower Gompers index is more likely to be proactive in CEO dismissals (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick 2003).  CEO characteristics are collected from the execucomp database. CEO 
Ownership is defined as the average of the sum of stocks and option owned by the CEO during 
the time to dismissal period scaled by the total number of stock outstanding. (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1989). I control for the stock ownership of the firms’ CEO since large ownership 
positions, by conferring greater power to the CEO, have been found to be negatively related to 
the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Huson et al., 2001; Shen et al., 2002). CEO stock ownership 
may also affect inside/outside succession (Boeker et al., 1993). Greater ownership gives the CEO 
more bargaining power because of associated voting rights, reducing the chance of the CEO 
being forced to leave (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989). Also, CEO ownership is positively 
associated with higher firm value thus must be controlled for (Griffith, 1999). Managers having 
higher levels of ownership are more likely to act in shareholder interests (Jensen et al., 1976). 
CEO Age is the average of the CEO age during his tenure. CEO Origin is defined as whether the 
CEO comes from inside or outside the firm. The outcome of a previous succession event – 
whether an insider or outsider was named- can affect a current succession (Fredrickson et al 
1988, Ocasio 1999). Dalton and Kesner (1985), following the approach of Helmich, defined an 
insider as an employee promoted from within a firm and an outsider as any other individual. If 
the CEO had been an employee for more than 1 year at the firm before becoming a CEO, I define 
that individual as an insider. All else, is defined as an outsider. Firm size is measured as the 
average market value of equity and market-to-book ratio during the time to dismissal period. I 
control for firm size since larger firms, by virtue of their more extensive shareholdings, will be 
more closely scrutinized by the financial community. Earlier studies have examined firm size as 
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a determinant of likelihood of CEO dismissal and as a determinant of inside/outside succession 
(Dalton et al., 1985; Huson et al., 2001).  Although many of these variables are time dependent, 
because my parametric hazard model can only incorporate time-invarying covariates I choose an 
average or a point in time for the measures.  
 
4. 3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Examining the Antecedents of Speed of CEO Dismissal 
Table 4.3 Control Variable Definition and Measure
Variable Definition Measure Source
Recommendation Drop Magnitude of stock recommendation 
drop
The first mean of consensus analysts' stock 
recommendation after the CEO start date that is 
below the last mean consensus stock 
recommendation prior to the CEO start date minus 
the last mean stock recommendation prior to the 
CEO start date
IBES
Abnormal Return Current stock based firm performance 
which is the value weighted market 
adjusted return during the CEO tenure 
period following the first downgrade
Abnormal return is the firm return less the market 
return measured monthly
CRSP
ROA Change Current accounting based firm 
performance which is the average ROA 
during the CEO tenure period following 
the first downgrade minus the average 
yearly ROA prior to the first downgrade 
date 
Average net income divided by total assets during 
the CEO tenure period following the first 
downgrade minus the average yearly ROA prior to 
first downgrade
CRSP/IBES
Duality CEO holds chairman position An indicator variable that is 1 if the CEO also 
serves as the chairman of the board of directors 
and 0 if otherwise
RiskMetrics
Board Independence Proportion of independent (outside) 
board members
Ratio of outside board members during the CEO 
tenure period following the first downgrade
RiskMetrics
Board Size Size of corporate board Number of board members RiskMetrics
CEO Ownership Total compensation of CEO Average salary, bonus, LTIP plus sum of stock and 
options scaled by the total number of stocks 
outstanding during the period following downgrade
Execucomp
CEO Age Age of CEO Average age of the CEO during the period 
following first downgrade
Execucomp
CEO Origin Insider or Outsider Indicator variable which is 1 if the CEO had been 
employed by the firm(insider) for more than one 
 b f  b i  CEO  0 if 
Execucomp
CEO Gender Male or Female Indicator variable that is one if the CEO is male 
and zero otherwise
Execucomp
Firm size Market value average market value of equity during the period 
following first downgrade
Compustat
Market to Book MB ratio average market-to-book ratio during the period 
following first downgrade
Compustat
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In examining hypotheses 1-3, I use a hazard function to model speed of dismissal. A 
hazard model is often used in measuring failure times or, in my case, time to CEO termination. A 
hazard model is particularly valuable when there is right censoring and because it incorporates 
time at risk. Prior studies that have used CEO turnover to understand corporate governance have 
relied on logit analysis (Denis et al 1997, Hambrick 2005). However, Shumway (2001) shows 
that cross-sectional logit is an inconsistent estimator of the probability of termination because it 
does not account for time at risk. The risk that the CEO will be fired given that s/he has stayed 
this long.  
 There are two general approaches to estimating the hazard function: the proportional 
hazard model (COX model) and the accelerated failure time model (AFT model). The advantage 
of the proportional hazard model is that the coefficient vector can be estimated without 
specifying the baseline hazard function. The results of AFT models are easily interpreted because 
projected survival probabilities may be derived. AFT gives time ratios not hazard ratios – a more 
direct interpretation of the estimated coefficient. Cox said, “accelerated failure models are in 
many ways more appealing” than the proportional hazard model “because of their quite direct 
physical interpretation” (Reid, 1994). 
The main drawback of AFT models is the need to specify the distribution that most 
appropriately mirrors that of the actual survival times – thus called a parametric model. Where a 
suitable distribution can be found, however, the AFT model is more informative than the Cox 
model. It is straightforward to derive the hazard function and to obtain predicted survival times 
when using a parametric model, which is not the case in the Cox framework. Additionally, the 
appropriate use of these models offers the advantage of being slightly more efficient; they yield 
more precise estimates (i.e. smaller standard errors). The regression parameter estimates from 
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AFT models are more robust to omitted covariates. They are also less affected by the choice of 
probability distribution.  
 The time-to-dismissal from first analyst downgrade of CEO tenure in a firm T is a 
random variable with a probability density f (t) and a cumulative density F(t). The likelihood that 
a CEO is dismissed, given that s/he has not been dismissed in the interval [0,T], is h(t) = f(t)/(1 − F(t)) 
I can use a nonparametric method to model the effects of covariates on the hazard, or parametric 
methods such as the accelerated failure time approach to model the effects of independent 
variables on time-to-event, i.e., dismissal. For the given reasons, I opt to use an AFT approach. 
In the accelerated failure time approach, the hazard of takeoff is of the form 
hi(t, Xi) = expaXih0(expaXi  t) 
i.e., the impact of independent variables on the hazard for the ith observation is to accelerate or 
decelerate time-to-dismissal as compared to the baseline hazard (Srinivasan et al. 2004). An 
easier way of estimating this model is to write it as follows which can be thought of as similar to 
a regression model:  
Y = Xβ + σε  
Where Y is the vector of the log of time-to-dismissal, X is the matrix of covariates which 
includes main explanatory variables (distinctiveness, consistency, commonality),  governance 
variables (fraction of independent directors, board size, CEO duality CEO ownership), CEO 
characteristics variables (age, tenure, origin) and other controls (firm size), β is a vector of 
unknown regression parameters, δ is an unknown scale parameter, and ε is a vector of errors, 
assumed to come from a known distribution such as normal, log-gamma, logistic, extreme value 
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forms leading to the log-normal, gamma, log-logistic, or the Weibull/exponential distributions 
for T, respectively. I use PROC LIFEREG in SAS to estimate this model (Allison 1995). The 
estimation is done via maximum likelihood.  
 The choice of the functional form for the distribution of the error term is important since 
it determines the shape of the hazard function. I use the generalized gamma distribution because 
it allows the greatest flexibility in the shape of the hazard function and includes the exponential 
Weibull and log-normal distributions as special cases. The exponential distribution has a 
constant hazard function, so that the time-to-dismissal does not depend on time (tenure). The 
Weibull distribution has a hazard function that is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing. 
A strictly increasing hazard would be consistent with board’s becoming less tolerant of the CEO 
as time progresses. A strictly decreasing hazard would be consistent with the CEO gaining power 
over the board as time progresses. The log-normal distribution has an inverse-U shaped hazard 
function. An inverse U shape is implied with Ocasio’s power of circulation theory (1992) where 
the CEO takes some time to gain influence over the board. Overall, I find the log-normal 
distribution and present the result in chapter six. Chapter six will show which distribution best 
describes the data.  
4.3.2 Examining the Consequences of Speed of CEO Dismissal 
As the ultimate goal of this part is to examine the relation between time it takes to 
dismissal which is unrelated to the firm’s performance and future firm performance, I define a 
variable called ‘excess time’. The definition of excess time is the portion of time to CEO 
dismissal unrelated to the firm’s performance and governance. I first measure excess time using 
the residual from the OLS regression of the determinants of speed of CEO dismissal. I generate 
three measures of excess time each controlling for firm performance, strength of governance and 
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other controls. Next, using the excess time measures I divide the sample into three categories of 
slow, medium and fast. I next use the three categories and see the relationship with future firm 
performance to examine which category has the best post-succession firm performance.  
4.3.3. Examining the Trend and Sarbanes Oxley Effects of CEO Dismissal 
In this section, I examine the speed of CEO dismissal by fiscal year to graph a trend line. 
Next, I divide the sample into CEOs that have been dismissed prior to the SOX enactment and 
post the SOX enactment. A t-test and Wilcoxon test is used to compare the means and medians 
between speed of dismissal for the pre-SOX dismissals and post-SOX dismissals. I also examine 
the post-succession firm performance of the pre-SOX dismissals and post-SOX dismissals. The 
mean and median difference was also tested using the t-test and Wilcoxon test.
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERVIEWS AND QUALITATIVE DATA 
 In this chapter, I report from interviews with three members of board of directors that 
have served on various public and private firms. Although the number of interviewees is small, 
these board members have extensive experience governing over a total of fifteen firms. 
Therefore, evidence accumulated across several firms and different situations provides added 
validity. The interviews were conducted to strengthen the grounding of theory by triangulation of 
evidence. Using prior literature as the basis for building theory, the interviews were used to 
validate that my research questions and constructs I am examining are legitimate. Through the 
interviews, I was able to confirm assumptions and build internal validity of my hypotheses. The 
broad research questions explored are the following:  
- How often is the CEO monitored and evaluated? Is there a time in a CEO’s tenure in 
which s/he is more prone to being evaluated more attentively?   
- What kind of performance measures and signals are used in the evaluation of the CEO?  
- What kind of information does financial analyst ratings portray?  
- Did regulatory changes and trends affect the behavior of the board of directors?  
I was careful not to bias the interviewee in order to confirm my theory and hypotheses. I took the 
approach provided by Yin (1984) and Eisenhardt (1989) and kept the questions generally open to 
retain flexibility in the answers. The selection criteria for interviewees was simply that the 
interviewee has to have held a board of director position at a public firm and has experience 
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evaluating the CEO of the firm. The interview was conducted with advisor Hugh O’Neill. The 
notes were retyped and compared in order to provide accuracy. The survey used is in appendix 1.  
 
5.1 Interview Members 
I was able to conduct interviews with three executives, anonymously listed below due to 
confidentiality agreements, currently holding board of director positions at public firms.   
1. Board member A: Chairman of the board of directors and partner of North Carolina based 
investment firm. Served as board member for over nine public and non-profit firms. Has 
experience with CEO dismissal while serving on corporate board.  
2. Board member B: CEO and Chairman of a pharmaceutical company. Held various 
executive positions at public and private firms.  
3. Board member C: Current board member of two public firms. Served on boards of over 
five energy and telecommunications firms. Several of the firms were in a turnaround 
situation while he served on corporate board.  
 
5.2 Interview Results and Findings 
The findings I extracted from the interviews are as follows:  
1. Functions of the board change based on performance. Bad performance leads to more 
frequent checks, use of sub committees, and closer monitoring of CEO.  
“When a firm is doing really well boards have a relatively easy job. We are happy and 
just deal with issues that come up such as routine succession. When a company is not doing 
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well boards look for a lot more detail. … gets increasingly critical as problem persists. They 
spend a lot more time.” – Board member A 
2. Financial performance is most important. Performance measures can be financial 
performance, budgets, market share, external events, and industry performance.  
Depending on the industry, different performance metrics can be used (i.e. for 
pharmaceutical companies progress in clinical programs, time based process checks, 
FDA approval)  
“Everything pales compared to firm performance. If the company is doing well 
financially. The board will put up with an awful lot.  If a firm is doing great, growing faster 
than competition, and the CEO is, let’s say he is socially kind of a diamond in the rough and 
not a guy you’d like to see your daughter marry, but if the firm is doing well, you’d have a 
terrible time getting rid of that CEO.” –Board member A 
3. Using share price as a predictor of firm performance and CEO performance was viewed 
as important by two board members whereas the CEO/Chairman said that share price is 
not important and is surely not indicative of CEO performance.  
  “ Market is irrational and share price is a bad predictor. Is it the CEOs fault that stock 
plummets 35% after products get FDA approval? “ – Board member B 
4. Different types of performance (distinctiveness, consistency, commonality) have 
individual effects on the decision to 1) raise issue of whether the firm/ CEO should be 
monitored more closely 2) contemplate if the CEO should be retained or fired 3) finalize on 
the decision to fire a new CEO. The terms such as persistence, compared to competitors, 
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sharp downturns were used when mentioning firm performance, thus indicative that these 
specific performance measures are used in evaluation of firm/CEO performance.  
Consistency: “ If problem persists it’s hard not to fire. Even if you get somebody else and 
he does worse you’re almost forced to make a change. “ - Board member A 
“When the company is not doing well the board gets increasingly more critical as 
the problem persists. They spend a lot more time.” – Board member B 
“A down quarter may not be enough but if down years persist you have to decide 
whether to let the CEO stay or not. “ – Board member C 
 
Distinctiveness: “early signals of bad performance is dramatic stock decrease” – Board 
member B  
Commonality: “Competitor comes out with new product this triggers questions.” – 
Board member B 
 “Examine if business is growing with industry.” – Board member C 
“ Financial performance and competitive status is the key metric – even if you don’t like 
the guy you can’t fire.” – Board member A 
5. The timing of CEO is almost not explicitly of concern. Board member A said that most 
CEOs are never fired too early but rather always too late.  In contrast, board member C 
thinks they are alert enough to intervene before things get bad. However, there was a case 
when “not good behavior” was only noticed when the CEO was about to retire and 
truncated his time. This could be a case of “too late”.  
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“gets so bad as they don’t want to stay on the board they are encouraged to 
change the CEO and say they did their job as board members. However, people try to 
avoid it. “ – Board member A 
6. Analyst ratings and external news reporters are useful signals of firm performance and 
CEO performance.  Downgrades sometimes come as surprises and CEO’s are monitored 
more closely and how a CEO responds to the downgrade is examined. Many comments 
show that boards are relatively late in their information than managers and do use analyst 
information. However, the cause of the downgrade and how a CEO responds was a more 
critical issue than the downgrade itself.  
“ newspaper reporter got wind of some news and began asking questions. This 
triggered boards to pay attention. “ – Board member C 
“ analysts provide very good information, we ask what are we missing? I thought 
analysts were sometimes wrong because they didn’t give much credit for investment 
in South America. Ultimately we sold it and selling was a good decision” – Board 
member C 
“If you’ve been doing very well.. and analysts were expecting you to grow 
18~20% you get downgraded because you grow 10~12%. Frankly most board’s 
don’t’ care.  It’s not a big deal. Who cares? The board cares about what causes the 
downgrade and how a CEO responds. “  - Board member A 
“ Even if it’s not the CEOs fault. It’s on his watch. “ – Board member A 
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7. One example, told by board member A, about a board member resigning because of 
conflicts with the CEO shows that board members may resign when the CEO has 
relatively more power than board members. Board member A quotes that the CEO did 
not like diversity in board members nor did he want them to be active in their 
involvement.  He wanted followers.  
“ Ed (anonymized) is a follower he will be a good board member. I need 
difference but nothing extreme. Boards need to be active to an extent where it’s not 
deficient to the management. … They should not be in control. Sometimes boards use 
CEOs for their own interest. I have faced angry hostile shareholders. After talking with 
them if they are not satisfied ask them to go elsewhere. “ – Board member B 
“ If the board is unhappy with the CEO but can’t do anything he resigns. I quit 
from a board because I didn’t like the way the guy was running the company. “ – Board 
member A 
8. There are more human aspects than straightforward logical in making the decision to 
retain or fire a CEO.  
“ Even if it’s not the CEOs fault. It’s on his watch. No one wants to do the dirty 
job and fire the CEO. “ – Board member A 
9. Regulatory trends and SOX may or may not matter. Several say they are more alert others 
say the regulations have more to do with the internal audit department than board 
members. However, there were comments on how boards are held liable and have to be 
careful with actions.  
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“ We are more alert and rigorous after SOX. We need to demonstrated processes 
and be more objective.” – Board member A 
“There isn’t that much impact on us. However, because of the processes in place 
we do find some surprises. There is a tendency to limit CEO tenure.” – Board member C 
“Laws are selling air. You cannot legislate honesty. The regulations don’t have 
much effect on evaluation of the CEO. “– Board member B 
5.3 Evidence for Hypotheses Support 
Overall, I found evidence for most of my hypotheses. However, given the small number 
of interviewees, within case analysis is not sufficient for finding cross-case patterns. The 
interviews were more for providing description and evidence of existence (Kidder 1982).  Also, 
the interviews show that an analyst rating are of important information and validates that future 
firm performance following a downgrade and how a CEO responds is critical information. One 
interviewee also cautioned that over 90% of CEO exits previous to retirement age are probably 
“suggested exits”.  
Table 5.1. Evidence for Hypotheses
Hypothesis Confirmation Evidence
H1 (+) Distinctiveness – Construct mentioned as performance metric of evaluating the 
firm and CEO
H2 (+) Consistency - Construct mentioned as performance metric of evaluating the 
firm and CEO
H3 (+) Commonality - Construct mentioned as performance metric of evaluating the 
firm and CEO
H4 (?) Speed of dismissal and future firm performance will have inverted U shape 
relationship – Not explicitly mentioned but there were cases of CEOs being 
fired too late
H5 (+) Speed of dismissal will increase after SOX – Comments on how there is a 
tendency to limit CEO tenure in recent years but not explicitly on faster 
 H6 (?) Post succession performance after SOX will increase. – Comments on how 
internal auditing processes are more in place. But also that honesty cannot be 
regulated
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 I have split the analysis of the data into three parts. First, I analyze how different types of 
performance feedback affects the time it takes for corporate boards to fire the CEO outlined in 
Chapter three. This analysis is based on all CEO-firm pair observations that have incurred at 
least one analyst downgrade during the CEO’s tenure. Second, I analyze whether the speed of 
dismissal following an analyst downgrade has an effect on post-succession firm performance. 
This part is explored using descriptive statistics and also some confirmatory data analysis. Third, 
I analyze how the speed of CEO dismissal has changed before and after SOX enactment.  I 
compare the speed of CEO dismissals that have occurred before the 2002 SOX enactment and 
the speed of CEO dismissals that have occurred after. I end this chapter by giving a summary of 
all the hypotheses and their results.  
 
6.1 Data Overview and Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics provide an understanding of the speed of CEO dismissals and 
corporate governance characteristics of the firm. I first report the frequency distribution in Figure 
6.1 of “speed of CEO dismissal” to examine if there exists variance in the variable. The figure 
exhibits a distribution where CEOs are fired frequently during the first four years following a 
downgrade. The highest frequency occurs at one and two years and decreases slightly at three 
years and increases again at four years showing a tendency that CEOs get fired quite early after a 
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performance downgrade or are given a few more years to improve performance. 62.7% of CEOs 
are fired during the first four years.  
  Figure 6.1: Distribution of Speed of CEO Dismissals
 
Table 6.1 illustrates descriptive statistics for the sample of 376 CEO-firm observations. 
The mean speed of response is 4.58 years.  
Table 6.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables used in the hazard 
model that follows. Several features of the correlation matrix merit further discussion. The 
correlations show that many variables are related to speed of CEO dismissal as expected. Most 
corporate governance measures are significant and positively correlated with speed of CEO 
dismissal, indicating that firms with strong governance are likely to dismiss CEOs sooner under 
deteriorating firm performance situations. Of the attribution variables only the consistency 
variable shows a significant and positive correlation with faster dismissals. CEO tenure is highly 
correlated with speed of dismissal. This is not surprising as both reflect a time variable and the 
longer the CEO stays in office after a downgrade will also mean the longer the CEO tenure. 
Because of multicollinearity, this variable was taken out of the hazard analysis but I use other 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Skew Max Med Min N
1 Speed of Dismissal 4.58 2.55 1.05779533 15.46 4.213699 1.03 376
2 CEO Tenure 5.74 2.60 0.72625987 15.51 5.415068 1.42 376
3 CEO Ownership 0.02 0.02 3.03502694 0.15 0.012989 0.00 373
4 CEO Age 53.86 6.19 -0.9425555 62.50 55.5 35.50 143
5 CEO Origin 0.41 0.49 0.3757623 1.00 0.00 0.00 191
6 CEO Gender 0.98 0.15 -6.254127 1.00 1.00 0.00 376
7 Duality 0.72 0.37 -1.0133503 1.00 1.00 0.00 376
8 Board Independence 0.66 0.15 -0.673142 0.92 0.674908 0.11 376
9 Board Size 9.47 2.45 0.386296 17.67 9.267857 3.33 376
10 Recommendation Drop -0.45 0.35 -1.5947984 -0.01 -0.37 -2.00 376
11 ROA Change 0.00 0.33 -2.1109712 0.99 0.01108 -1.71 376
12 Abnormal Return 7.27 141.07 2.40511796 735.00 -20.331 -211.21 376
13 Firm Size 9009.79 19996.93 3.65865626 116531.00 1585.275 70.35 376
14 Market to Book 3.68 4.32 4.79143269 33.85 2.48507 0.63 373
15 Distinctiveness 0.00 0.00 0.42219626 0.01 -0.00018 -0.01 376
16 Consistency 0.00 0.00 2.82051499 0.01 0.001032 0.00 376
17 Commonality 0.72 0.70 0.65168332 2.89 0.66623 -0.55 376
variables that capture the effect of CEO tenure. Prior literature emphasizes that CEO tenure 
would mean greater power and weaker governance. I have various other measures of corporate 
governance which is positively correlated with CEO tenure in the model. For the performance 
variables, ROA change is not significant. Abnormal stock return is significant and positively 
correlated with speed of dismissal which suggests that higher performance leads to slower 
dismissals. Control variables of firm size or market-to-book ratios do not seem to have 
significant effects.  
 
 
Table 6.2 Correlation Table
Variable
1 Speed of Dismissal 1.00
2 CEO Tenure 0.84 *** 1.00
3 CEO Ownership 0.08 0.05 1.00
4 CEO Age -0.11 -0.10 -0.30 *** 1.00
5 CEO Origin -0.22 *** -0.23 *** -0.04 -0.13 1.00
6 CEO Gender -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.13 * 1.00
7 Duality 0.14 *** 0.16 *** -0.06 0.26 *** -0.07 -0.01 1.00
8 Board Independence 0.14 *** 0.16 *** -0.14 *** 0.17 ** -0.03 -0.01 0.25 *** 1.00
9 Board Size -0.01 0.02 -0.33 *** 0.29 *** 0.15 ** 0.04 0.25 *** 0.03 1.00
10 Recommendation Drop 0.12 ** -0.02 -0.12 ** -0.06 0.13 * -0.06 0.07 0.05 0.14 ** 1.00
11 ROA Change 0.06 0.11 ** 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.12 ** -0.01 1.00
12 Abnormal Return 0.26 *** 0.25 *** 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.18 *** -0.04 -0.03 0.15 ** 1.00
13 Firm Size -0.01 0.03 -0.24 *** 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.17 *** 0.05 0.44 ** 0.13 ** 0.10 * 0.02 1.00
14 Market to Book -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.13 ** 0.12 ** 0.07 0.15 ** 1.00
15 Distinctiveness 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.15 * 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.20 ** 0.00 -0.08 0.00 1.00
16 Consistency -0.58 *** -0.51 *** 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.11 ** -0.18 *** -0.13 ** -0.10 * -0.09 * -0.13 ** -0.15 ** -0.04 0.08 1.00
17 Commonality -0.04 -0.02 0.10 ** -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 ** -0.09 * -0.23 ** -0.17 ** -0.20 ** -0.02 -0.24 ** -0.18 ** 0.01 0.27 *** 1.00
14 15 16 178 9 10 11 12 132 3 4 5 6 71
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.00
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6.2 Results of Antecedents of Speed of CEO Dismissal 
The hazard model was employed to test three hypotheses of attribution variables: 
distinctiveness, consistency, and commonality. The dependent variable of the analysis is the log 
of time it takes to fire a CEO following the first analyst downgrade of the CEO’s tenure.   
 I first examine the shape of the hazard function to see the relationship of risk of 
termination with speed of response. The Kaplan Meier product-limit method survival curve 
provides a useful summary of the data that can be used to estimate measures such as median 
survival time. Table 6.3 shows a figure of the hazard function of speed of dismissal using the 
Kaplan Meier Estimation (PROC LIFETEST in SAS). The graph shows that the hazard of CEO 
dismissal increases up to approximately 8 years after first downgrade and then goes down until 
12 years and then goes back up. The last part where the hazard shoots up is likely to be irrelevant 
to the initial downgrade effects as to too lengthy a time after event.  
Figure 6.2 Base Hazard Rate of Speed of CEO Dismissal 
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 Next, I estimate an AFT model using the LIFEREG procedure in SAS. The first step is to 
choose the distribution that best characterizes the data to analyze the shape of the hazard 
function. Table 6.3 reports the results of the “fit statistics” and the likelihood ratio tests of 
exponential, Weibull, log-normal distributions against the alternative of the generalized gamma 
distribution. As the considered distributions are all nested in the generalized gamma distribution 
a likelihood ratio test can be used in addition to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian information criterions (BIC) values. The Gamma and log-normal distributions have the 
smallest fit statistics which means a better fit. The Weibull and exponential distributions are 
rejected in favor of the generalized gamma; the p-values for the likelihood ratio test are 0.001. 
However, I cannot reject the hypothesis of the log-normal distribution (p=0.85). Consequently, I 
report the results of the log-normal distribution in the following tests. Ocasio (1994) and 
Brookman & Thistle(2009) also use the log-normal distribution in their examination of CEO 
tenure. The results for the generalized gamma distribution are qualitatively the same as those for 
the log-normal distribution.  
 
 I next examine the effects of the covariates on speed of response to downgrade. The 
results for the duration model using the log-normal distribution are presented in Table 6.4. The 
analysis is done by stepwise addition of effects to show how the model behaves when corporate 
governance and CEO characteristics are included as covariates. The models are nested, allowing 
stepwise testing for improvement of fit. The first model shows the effect of the attribution 
variables on the time it takes to respond to downgrade. The second model added the magnitude 
Table 6.3 Statistics for distribution choice
Against generalized gamma distribution
Null hypothesis AIC BIC Log Likelihood Chi square p-value
Gamma 369.562 393.139 -178.7809744
Lognormal 368.349 387.996 -179.174253 0.7865572 <0.8542
Weibull 442.105 471.753 -221.0526 84.5432512 *** <0.001
Exponential 820.194 835.913 -406.09 454.6180512 *** <0.001
FitStatistics using attribution variables
64 
 
of recommendation downgrade and current firm performance. The third model introduces 
corporate governance variables. The fourth model includes CEO characteristics and firm size.  
For all the attribution variables, the coefficients are significant and in the hypothesized 
direction in Model 1,2,3. The significance disappears for the distinctiveness and commonality 
variable most likely due to small sample size in the full model (sample size 79). This implies that 
the greater the negative magnitude of change in stock market return(distinctiveness) throughout 
the years after analyst downgrade the faster the dismissal, the greater the consistency the slower 
the dismissal, and the less common the firm/CEO performs in comparison to the industry leads to 
faster dismissals. Note that a negative coefficient implies faster dismissal (less time-to-CEO 
dismissal). However, depending on how the covariate is measured the predicted could be a 
positive or a negative. These results are quite interesting as they show that not only is current 
performance important in making the decision to fire but that the type of performance downturn 
has individual effects on the decision to fire as well.  
Magnitude of analyst downgrades shows a significant coefficient showing that the 
magnitude of downgrade has an effect on speed of dismissal. Current firm performance 
measured in abnormal stock return (firm returns less market returns) shows that higher 
performance extends the time it takes to dismissal(slower dismissals). However, ROA does not 
have a significant effect.  
For the corporate governance variables, CEO duality and board size show a significant 
coefficient in the hypothesized direction.  If the CEO holds dual position this extends the CEOs 
time to dismissal suggesting that the CEOs power does have an effect on the decision to fire the 
CEO. Results show that the larger the boards size the faster the speed of dismissal. This is 
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interesting as large board size could be associated with longer decision making times. Results 
show the opposite.  
When including the CEO characteristics covariates and firm size controls, the overall 
sample size significantly decreases (N=79) and does not show significance in any of the 
covariates other than abnormal return. The decrease in sample size is because the archival data 
did not have much information on CEO origin and age. However, all the covariates other than 
CEO origin have estimated coefficients in the predicted direction.  
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6.3 Results of Consequences of Speed of CEO Dismissal 
The hazard function shows that different types of performance have individual effects on 
the speed of CEO Dismissal. But, an important question I address next is does speed of CEO 
dismissal have an effect on firm performance after the change in CEO. This part of the analysis 
shows that speed of CEO dismissal, apart from current firm performance of strength of corporate 
governance, does affect post succession firm performance as hypothesized in chapter three.  
Table 6.4 Hazard Models for Log-Normal Distribution
Variables Predicted
Distinctiveness (+) 22.6266 ** 25.0855 ** 22.1368 ** -18.962
(8.778) (8.792) (8.482) (29.729)
Consistency (-) -179.7 ** -174.74 *** -175.82 *** -236.33 ***
(8.554) (8.433) (8.403) (32.483)
Commonality (+) 0.1169 ** 0.1302 *** 0.113 *** 0.0852
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.053)
Recommendation Drop (+) 0.1471 ** 0.1577 ** 0.1018
(0.059) (0.058) (0.106)
Abnormal Return (+) 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0004 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA change (+) 0.0375
(0.064)
Duality (+) 0.1394 ** 0.1213
(0.057) (0.113)
Board independence (-) -0.1248 0.1564
(0.135) (0.273)
Board size (-) -0.0264 ** -0.0107
(0.009) (0.026)
CEO Ownership (+) 1.3274
(1.709)
CEO Age (+) 0.0042
(0.007)
CEO Origin (+) -0.0809
(0.113)
Firm Size (?) 0
(0.000)
Market to Book (?) 0.0083
(0.012)
Likelihodd value -183.09 -174.03 -167.85 -24.566
N 376 376 376 79
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses
Model 3 Model 4Model 1 Model 2
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As discussed in chapter five, I use the residual values from the model of determinants of 
speed of CEO dismissal. This allows to control for current firm performance, a major 
determinant in probability and speed of CEO dismissal. I conduct OLS regression of 
determinants of time as the first step and ultimately use the residuals from the regression models 
to create the measure of excess time. Excess time is the core construct defining speed of 
dismissal controlling for performance and governance effects. Ultimately, I obtain three 
alternative measures of excess time. Excess_Time1 is defined as the length of time it takes to fire 
a CEO controlling for current firm performance (abnormal return). This is the residual obtained 
from Model 3 in Table 6.5 Excess_Time 2 is defined as the length of time it takes to fire a CEO 
controlling for firm performance and strength of corporate governance. This is the residual 
obtained from the regression model 4.  
Table 6.5 reports the results of an OLS regression analysis on the cross sectional data set 
of 397 observations. This data set is slightly larger than the one employed in the hazard model as 
there were fewer missing data when not obtaining the attributional variables. The dependent 
variable on the analysis is log of time-to-CEO-dismissal. Model 1 of the analysis shows that 
analyst downgrades do have an effect on the speed of CEO dismissal. The greater the magnitude 
of downgrades the faster the dismissal. Model 2 and Model 3 uses two different measures of 
current firm performance. ROA change and Abnormal stock return. As abnormal stock return is 
significant and shows that lower stock return leads to faster dismissal, I use the residuals from 
Model 3 as the first measures of excess time. These residuals, which I define as Excess_Time1 is 
a measure of speed of dismissal controlling for current firm performance. In Model 4, 
governance controls are included in the OLS regression model. Other than board independence, 
showing a coefficient in the opposite hypothesized direction, none of the variables are 
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significant. It is interesting to find that the higher the independence, having more outsiders on the 
board, leads to slower dismissal (a positive coefficient). The residual from model 4 is the second 
measure of excess time. These residuals, which I define as  Excess_Time2,  is a measure of 
speed of dismissal controlling for current firm performance and strength of corporate 
governance. Model 5 is the full model including firm performance, governance, CEO 
characteristics, and control variables. Other than abnormal return, none of the variables are 
significant. The residual from Model 5 is Excess_Time 3. This could be because of the small 
sample size.  
 
The next step of the analysis examines how the length of excess time relates with post 
succession firm performance. Each measure of excess time is categorized into three groups by 
Table 6.5 Determinants of Speed of CEO Dismissal
Variables Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 7.31 *** 7.25 *** 7.25 ***
(0.045) (0.029) (0.028)
Recommendation Drop (+) 0.14 *
(0.083)
Abnormal Return (+) 0.0008 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 ***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
ROA change (+) 0.10
(0.092)
Duality (+) 0.10 0.08
(0.141) (0.148)
Board independence (-) 0.34 * 0.58
(0.194) (0.33)
Board size (?) 0.00 -0.05
(0.000) (0.036)
CEO Ownership (+) 0.72
(2.323)
CEO Age (+) 0.00
(0.0004)
CEO Origin (+) -0.13
(0.149)
Firm Size (?) 0.00
(0.000)
Market to Book (?) 0.01
(0.011)
Number of Observations 397 397 397 383 83
Adj Rsquare 0.46% 0.05% 3.87% 3.35% 11.21%
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses
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their relative magnitude: Slow, Moderate, Fast. The categorization is made simply by dividing 
the sample into three equivalent sizes. This is a relative measure of how speed affects post-
succession performance controlling for current firm performance and other controls. I examine 
the speed of dismissal effects on the mean and median values of future stock returns and the 
change in ROA three years after the CEO end date. And, I calculate the mean and the median 
values of future stock returns and the change in ROA during three years after CEO end date. 
Panel A shows the mean values and panel B shows the median values. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that post-succession firm performance will have an inverted U 
relationship with speed of dismissal. This means that boards that fire the CEO in the moderate 
speed relative to other firms will outperform those in the slow or fast category. I use both mean 
(Panel A) and median values (Panel B) of post-succession firm performance.  
Table 6.6 shows the relationship between post-succession firm performance and speed of 
CEO dismissal(three measures of excess_time). In general the firms in the moderate group of 
speed of CEO dismissal seem to have the highest post-succession-performance among the three 
groups, which suggests an inverse U-shape relation between excess Timeliness and future 
performance. As shown for the measure Excess_Time1, both stock based and accounting based 
measures show that the firms categorized as moderate speed has the best performance and the 
difference is significant. Using Excess_Time2 which controls further for governance variances, 
firms categorized as moderate speed also outperform those in slow and fast for the ROA measure 
but stock based measures show that slow dismissals are better. Excess_Time 3 further controlling 
for CEO characteristics does not give the hypothesized results and are insignificant. These results 
also suggest corporate governance affects the decision to fire the CEO in a timely manner as the 
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variation in post-succession firms becomes smaller for Excess_Time2. Using Excess_Time 3, the 
differences are smaller and insignificant probably due to the small number of observations.  
Overall, this does give partial evidence that variation in speed of dismissal does affect 
post-succession firm performance. Results show that corporate boards may fire the CEO too 
early or too late following an analyst downgrade leading to lower post-succession performance.  
 
 
Table 6.6 Post -Sucession Firm Performance by  Speed of CEO Dismissal
  
Excess_Time1 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 132 -1.40% 0.60%
Moderate 133 24.20% 8.40% M - S (+) 25.56%** 7.73%* 
High 132 5.90% -1.50% H - M (-) -18.23%* -9.90%
     
Excess_Time2 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 127 14.40% 0.01
Moderate 128 10.90% 0.06 M - S (+) -3.40% 5.40%
High 128 -0.10% -0.01 H - M (-) -11.10% -6.80%
     
Excess_Time3 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 27 3.50% -0.40%
Moderate 28 -0.90% -1.40% M - S (+) -4.40% -1.00%
High 28 1.70% 3.40% H - M (-) 2.50% 4.70%
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
  
Excess_Time1 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 132 -16.60% 1.90%
Moderate 133 2.90% 1.10% M - S (+) 19.56%*** -0.80%
High 132 -4.60% -0.60% H - M (-) -7.55%** -1.66%* 
     
Excess_Time2 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 127 1.10% 0.70%
Moderate 128 -7.80% 2.30% M - S (+) -8.90% 1.67%* 
High 128 -8.40% -0.30% H - M (-) -0.50% -2.68%***
     
Excess_Time3 N Ab_Return Change ROA Change Predicted Sign Diff in Ab_Return Change Diff in ROA Change
Slow 27 -6.80% -0.20%
Moderate 28 -19.60% -5.40% M - S (+) -12.80% -5.20%
High 28 -8.40% 0.50% H - M (-) 11.20% 5.90%
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
Median
Median
Median
Panel A. Mean values of future stock returns and change in ROA
Mean
Mean
Mean
Panel B. Mean values of future stock returns and change in ROA
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6.4 Results of Trend and Sarbanes-Oxley Effects on Speed of CEO Dismissal 
Figure 6.3 shows the trend in “speed of CEO Dismissal” by fiscal year. Contrary to 
predictions, the trend seems to show a steady decrease in the speed of dismissal (becoming 
slower). Table 6.7 presents the number of dismissals, mean, and median of time-to-CEO-
dismissal over the period 1996-2009. The mean time to CEO dismissal has increased by an 
average of 1.9 years after year 2002, the year of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A t-test 
comparing the means of sub-period difference is significant at the p<0.01 level. As the Sarbanes-
Oxley act’s main objective is to give additional and more accurate information to the public, 
investment analysts might be downgrading the firm more frequently as can be seen from the 
increase in number of observations following year 2002.  
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Table 6.7 Trend in Speed of CEO Dismissal
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N 14 18 14 24 20 15 26 28 38 40 31 37 31 40
Mean 2.1 2 2.9 3 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.9 4.1 5.6 6.7 7.5
Median 2 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.3 4 3.9 4.9 3.1 3.7 3.9 5.5 6.2 7
Mean by subperiod 3.0 4.9
Median by subperiod 3.2 4.8
The difference in time to CEO dismissal before and after Sarbanes-Oxley is tested by T-test and is significant at the 1%level. 
 
 To examine Hypothesis 6, I examine firm performance three years after CEO dismissal 
for the observations before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley period. Observations with fiscal years, 
that CEO end date falls within, prior to 2002 are classified as Pre-SOX and observations with 
fiscal years, which CEO end date falls within, after 2002 are considered post-SOX. 
Ab_Return_3yrChange is the value-weighted market adjusted return during three years starting 
one month after the CEO end date minus the average during the CEO tenure. ∆ROA_1yr is the 
net income one year after CEO end date minus the average net income during the CEO tenure 
scaled by the beginning assets. ∆ROA_2yr is the average net income during the two years after 
CEO end date minus the average net income during the CEO tenure scaled by the beginning 
assets. ∆ROA_3yr is the average net income during the three years after CEO end date minus the 
average net income during the CEO tenure scaled by the beginning assets. 
 Depending on whether I am using stock based vs. accounting based measures, the results 
are opposite. When using change in abnormal return as the measure, for the firms in which 
boards have fired the CEO after year 2002 seem to do significantly worse. Whereas, if using 
accounting based measures firms in which boards that have fired CEOS after year 2002 seem to 
perform better. I also included one year and two year post-succession firm performance 
differences for ROA and the results seem to hold.  
 Hypothesis 6a predicted that post-succession performance would improve after 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act whereas Hypothesis 6b predicted that post-succession firm 
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performance would worsen. Using stock based measures I find confirmation for hypothesis 6a 
whereas the accounting measures confirm hypothesis 6b. Why such discrepancies between the 
two measures arise is yet to be investigated. Overall results show that boards have become more 
tolerant of the CEO, giving CEOs more time to recover after a downgrade.  
 
 
 
6.5 Summary of Results 
 Overall the regression on antecedents shows strong support for my attributional variables. 
The magnitude of performance change, the volatility of performance, and the commonality of 
performance all have individual effects on speed of CEO dismissal. Results of all the hypotheses 
are summarized in the following table. Further discussion of these findings and an exploration of 
their interrelationships are provided in the final chapter.  
Table 6.8 Post-Succession Firm Performance Before and After SOX
 
N Ab_Return_3yr Change ROA_1yr Change ROA_2yr Change ROA_3yr Change
Pre-SOX 105 44.95% -6.29% -10.46% -7.31%
Post-SOX 271 -3.64% 5.91% 9.44% 9.83%
 Difference -48.59%*** 12.20%** 19.90%*** 17.14%***
     
 
N Ab_Return_3yr Change ROA_1yr Change ROA_2yr Change ROA_3yr Change
Pre-SOX 105 34.72% 0.57% -0.20% -0.20%
Post-SOX 271 -10.90% 2.09% 2.88% 2.88%
 Difference -45.62%*** 1.51%** 3.08%*** 3.08%***
The difference is tested by T-test and is significant at the 1%level. 
Mean
Median
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Table 6.9 Summary of Results
Hypotheses Results
H1: High distinctiveness in decline information following an analyst downgrade will have 
faster CEO dismissals
Supported
H2: High consistency in decline information following an analyst downgrade will have faster 
CEO dismissals
Supported
H3: High commonality in decline information following an analyst downgrade will have 
faster CEO dismissals
Supported
H4: Speed of CEO dismissal following an analyst downgrade will have an inverted U shape 
relationship with post-succession firm performance 
Partial Support
H5: CEO dismissals occuring in the post-SOX period will have higher post-succession firm 
performance than CEO dismissals  occuring in the pre-SOX period
Partial Support when using 
ROA as performance metric
H6: CEO dismissals occuring in the post-SOX period will have low post-succession firm 
performance than CEO dismissals  occuring in the pre-SOX period
Partial Support when using 
Abnormal return as 
performance metric
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 This chapter contains three parts. First, a discussion of the research findings is presented. 
Second, implications of this study for theory and practice are discussed. Finally, the limitations 
of this study and suggestions for future research are provided.  
 
7.1. Discussion of Research Findings 
 This study set out to develop a model of speed of CEO dismissal by building on 
attribution theory.  CEO dismissal is most likely a response by corporate boards of directors for 
the CEO not performing accordingly with the corporate boards’ expectations. There has been 
extensive literature on CEO dismissals (see Finklenstein, et al 2008 for review), however, the 
majority of the literature has focused on corporate board composition and relative CEO power. 
These were based on economic and sociopolitical perspectives, rarely considering the influence 
of sense making and interpretation in the CEO dismissal process (Haleblian & Rajagopalan 
2006).  Although, Fredrickson et al, (1988), Schaffer (2002) and even more currently Haleblian 
& Rajagopalan(2006) emphasize that boards of directors’ expectations, attributions, allegiances 
and values play a critical role in CEO dismissals, up to my knowledge these behavioral models 
have not been empirically tested. The difficulty is that the boards’ interpretations cannot be 
explicitly measured but only theorized.  
I also integrate and build on downturn and strategic change literature (Ford 1987; 
Cameron et al 1987; Barker et al 1997; and Barr & Huff 1977 ). Many of the downturn and 
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strategic change literature focused on top managements’ response to performance downturn, 
however, boards of directors are also responsible for assessing the organization’s top 
management during periods of poor firm performance (Forbes and Milliken 1999). As the 
corporate board’s response and timeliness in response to performance downturn also has 
important implications for the firm, I identify the factors affecting the timing of strategic 
response at the corporate board level. 
By examining the board’s perception of performance, its attributions of different types of 
performance feedback after performance downturn and efficacy assessment of the CEO, I 
contribute to the CEO turnover literature by offering a behavioral and dynamic model that is 
empirically tested by developing measures of different types of informational cues of 
performance feedback.  I go one step further to examine not only the probability of CEO 
dismissal but also examine the time it takes to dismissing the CEO following a performance 
downgrade. As the result, this study yields insight into both the CEO turnover literature and 
turnaround and strategic Change literature.  
A two-stage research design employing both qualitative and quantitative data gathering 
was used in this study. The first stage employed qualitative case study to define and develop the 
constructs and model used in CEO dismissals. This initial phase helped to enrich the 
understanding of boards of directors’ perception and interpretation process in evaluating the 
CEO. The second stage of the research used an archival dataset and provided tests of the 
relationship hypothesized in the model. The archival data was collected from a population of 
public U.S. firms between 1992-2009.  
 The following sections summarize and discuss the research findings presented in Chapter 
Six. First, integrating corporate governance theory with attribution theory and examining the 
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processes by which board members attribute poor firm performance, I find insight into how 
performance following a performance downturn impact the decision to dismiss the CEO in a 
timely matter. Second, whether corporate boards’ speed of response affects future firm 
performance and whether boards are responding sub-optimally in their timeliness in response to 
downturn is identified. Third, I discuss how boards use the performance information following 
an analyst downgrade to assess the ability of a CEO. Finally, the insight into how the SOX 
legislation has affected corporate boards in their monitoring of the CEO is presented.  
7.1.1 Board assessments of managerial performance following performance downturn 
Many firms enter periods of declining performance and firms frequently alter strategies 
and structures in response to environmental changes (Chandler, 1962). Kiesler and Sproull’s 
(1982) seminal paper theorize that noticing and constructing meaning to internal or 
environmental feedback varies by the type of feedback and also disposition of the decision 
maker. Bar & Huff (1997) also provides evidence that there is diversity in the timing of strategic 
response to performance downturn. Ford (1985) further posits that response to performance 
downturn requires understanding decision makers’ attributions of causality. Along these lines of 
reasoning, I empirically test how different types of performance following performance 
downturn, proxied by an analyst downgrade, affect board’s perception and assessment of CEO 
performance.  
First, I developed measures of informational characteristics of performance feedback that 
are identified in attribution literature: distinctiveness, consistency, and commonality. These 
performance measures are stock based measures, conceptualizing different types of 
organizational downturn. My analysis tested whether these different types of performance 
feedback each had individual effects on board’s decision making of dismissing the CEO.  Results 
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showed that the stronger the magnitude in performance drop, the more consistency(less volatility) 
in performance, and the lower the commonness in performance compared to the industry in the 
faster the boards dismissed the CEO.  
These findings have important implications on strategy research. It demonstrates not all 
types of performance downturn are alike. Types of firm performance have different 
informational cues that board’s use in their perception and attribution of causality. This lends 
support to arguments (Pietcher et al 2000, Puffer & Weintrop 1991) that different measures of 
prior performance lead to inconsistent findings and difference in percentage of variance 
explained in CEO research. Researchers studying organization downturn also posit that there is a 
need to operationally differentiate types of organizational downturn and delineate the effects. 
Cameron, Kim, & Whetton (1987) emphasized the need to precisely specify the conceptual 
domain of organizational downturn clarifying that turbulence, stagnation, and uncertainty are 
different constructs.  This study also shows that the type of performance indicator or 
organizational downturn used by board has individual effects on the decision to dismiss a CEO.  
 There was also debate on whether corporate boards fire CEOs after bad firm performance 
caused by factors beyond CEO’s control. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) find that top 
management dismissals are equally likely to occur in troubled and in healthy industries, 
suggesting that CEO dismissal decisions are made regardless of industry shocks. However, 
Jenter & Kannan 2006 finds in a more recent dataset that CEOs are more likely to be dismissed 
from their jobs after bad industry and market performance. My results give evidence to the 
former in that corporate boards seem to filter some observable exogenous shocks when assessing 
CEOs quality.  
7.1.2 Effects of Speed of Response 
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 Strategic change literature posits that some firms are able to adjust to changing 
circumstances while others fail to respond (Whetten 1980, D’Aveni 1989). A common theme in 
organization downturn literature also examines when organizations notice and adapt to 
deteriorating performance and make strategic changes for turnaround (Hambrick & Schecter 
1983). The timeliness in response and adjustment was also seen as a critical factor for successful 
turnaround (Barr & Huff 1997, Witteloostujin 1998). My results support these studies in the 
CEO dismissal phenomena that the speed of response by corporate board members also impact 
future firm performance.  
Several studies suggest that responses are accurate and rationally made in a timely matter 
(Ertugrul & Krishnan 2008). Other studies suggest that because boards are bounded rational and 
interpretation can be biased and optimal response time may not always be the case (Dranikoff et 
al 2002; Golden & Zajac 2001). Results suggest that there is an optimal time in speed of 
response following performance downturn. Firms that have responded to downgrades by firing a 
CEO in a moderate speed compared to other firms that have responded at slower or faster speed 
performed better. Although this is a relative measure of speed of dismissal, this is evidence that 
too fast or too slow response time will lead to sub-optimal future firm performance. Such early 
dismissals might suggest that corporate boards may replace the CEO without having 
appropriately assessed the cause of downturn. Removing a CEO in such a way can adversely 
affect the value of a firm due to the lack of a consistent and stable leadership and replacement 
costs. The study also highlights that entrenched CEOs who should be fired hold on to their 
positions, which again raises issued to the board’s fiduciary role.  
7.1.3 Information of Analyst Downgrades 
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I used investment analyst downgrades as a proxy of the start of performance downturn. 
Prior literature finds that analyst downgrades affect the probability of CEO dismissal (Wierserma 
2008). However, how the CEO responds to the analyst downgrade and whether a 
positive/negative response is rewarded/penalized by the board of directors has not been 
examined. Analyst downgrades are an uncertain signal and boards of directors will keep a closer 
eye on the CEO. My results find that performance following the downgrade which portrays how 
the CEO is responding to negative recommendations is an important metric in the assessment of 
CEO qualities. Stronger governance characterized by larger board size and no CEO duality also 
showed faster response times of firing the CEO following an analyst downgrade.  
7.1.4 Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation 
 This study examined the impact Sarbanes-Oxley has on speed of CEO dismissals and 
future firm performance. From open ended interviews, there were mixed responses by the 
interviewees who had served as board members in various firms. There was a view that SOX had 
absolutely no effect on board decision making and evaluation of the CEO. Another view said that 
there are processes that had to be put in place and because of these processes boards do find 
surprises in CEO quality. Rigor has increased after SOX has been put in place and there is a 
tendency to limit CEO tenure. My empirical results show that there is a significant effect of 
Sarbanes Oxley on corporate boards’ decision to fire the CEO. Interestingly, opposite to my 
hypothesis that corporate boards will be faster with their dismissal due to increased shareholder 
activism I find that in fact corporate boards are increasingly becoming slower in their decisions 
to fire the CEO following an analyst downgrade. Because I do not control for any other reasons 
but only examine speed of CEO dismissal with a split sample of pre-SOX and post-SOX data, 
there can be several explanations for this.  
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Slower dismissals mean that boards are doing more due-diligence before replacing the 
CEO. It could be that after SOX, boards are being held more liable to their decisions and are 
being cautious with their decision to fire. Another reason that boards are taking more time to 
replace CEOs could be that there is a lack of available candidates. Given the increase in the 
number of dismissals (Booz Allen 2008) it could be the pool of applicants have dried up. Also, 
many CEO dismissals come from merger-related turnovers. As there have been decreases in 
mergers over time this may also give CEOs more time.  
Such a trend has mixed implications on post-succession firm performance. Given, that the 
objective of the SOX legislation was to increase monitoring of the CEO and top managers by 
setting processes in place for better monitoring, it is likely that boards would make better 
decisions in replacing the CEO thereby having better future firm performance. However, 
examining the change in future firm performance and firm performance before CEO dismissal 
for firms in pre-SOX and post-SOX periods I find that firms are doing worse for firms that have 
fired CEOs in the post-SOX period when using stock based return measures. As I use abnormal 
returns which controls for market influences which is the difference between the expected return 
and actual return on an investment, it could be that investor’s expected return could be erroneous  
have more uncertainty especially with market crashes in 2008. However, when using accounting 
based measures firms with CEO dismissals in the post-SOX period do significantly better than 
those in the pre-SOX period. This provides partial support to my hypothesis that better 
monitoring is in place.  
 
7.2 Implications for Theory and Practice 
82 
 
 This research contributes to theory and practice in several ways. Specific theoretical and 
practical contributions of this study are outlined in the following sections.  
7.2.1 Attribution Theory 
First, this study contributes to attribution theory by empirically testing the Kelley(1973) and 
Weiner (1974) covariation model of attribution in the CEO dismissal phenomena. While the use 
of attribution theory at the individual level has been thoroughly tested in psychology literature 
(Martinko 1998), how attribution  arise at the group level and board of directors level has yet to 
be thoroughly tested. In strategy literature attribution theory has been used as an umbrella theory 
to explain causal reasoning of firm performance (Bettman & Weitz 1983; Mitchell et al 1981) or 
how managers strategically manipulate causal attribution to manage impressions (Meindl 1985; 
Hambrick et al 2008). In this particular study I integrate corporate governance literature with 
attribution theory to explain that political effects and cognitive effects have individual effects on 
the actions of boards of directors. This highlights that the CEO dismissal process has varying 
human aspects and is prone to errors in decision making. My research does not test whether 
boards misattribute the cause of downturn inappropriately to the CEO nor does it test the 
fundamental attribution error (Jones & Nisbett 1971). However, the results do hint that corporate 
boards are bounded rational and interpretation of performance feedback can lead to sub-optimal 
response time. Furthermore, my research highlights that there are costs to firing the CEO and 
replacing CEOs in response to short-term performance problems may in fact inadvertently 
penalize the firm. 
 Second, this study also contributes to attribution theory by developing measures 
frequently cited as different types of performance feedback. I incorporate Dess & Beard’s(1984) 
measure of environmental volatility at the firm level to measure firm consistency. The 
83 
 
distinctiveness measure utilized data during the period for a more precise measure of magnitude 
of change rather than the more simple measure of taking the change at two time points. These 
types of performance measures can be used in testing almost any corporate strategy or business 
strategy decision making.  
7.2.2  Corporate Governance and Board Decision Making  
In clarifying the antecedents of speed of CEO dismissal, this research provides insights to 
practitioners regarding how boards should be careful in replacing the CEO and that the timing 
could have an effect on future firm performance. As suggested by this study, firms firing too 
early may not be giving CEOs ample time to recoup their faults and develop new strategies. This 
study also suggests that CEOs holding board chairmen positions and larger boards are faster in 
their dismissals.  This study also emphasizes again the problems of entrenched CEOs suggesting 
that older CEOs who have more power are not dismissed in a fast enough matter.  
For investors, the study does show that firing the CEO may not necessarily lead to better 
stock returns. There are many papers on how the stock market reacts to CEO dismissals 
(Reinganum 1985; Zhang & Wiersema 2009) and the reactions were conditional upon a variety 
of factors including information investment analysts provide. I contribute to the literature on how 
information following an analyst downgrade provides information on CEO ability. How the CEO 
responds and recoups its losses is valuable information in the decision of boards on whether to 
retain or dismiss the CEO.  
Finally, this study provides implications on how institutional regulations affect corporate 
governance. After SOX legislation was enacted in 2002, there have been several literatures 
examining the impact SOX has. Most have examined how the structure of  board(Chhaorchharis 
& Grinstein 2007; Valenti 2008) and earning management(Jensen et al 2004; Koh et al 2010) 
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have changed. This study contributes by examining how CEO dismissals have changed. Results 
show that legislations do have an effect on board decision making which further affect firm 
performance.  
 
7.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Several limitations of this study should be noticed. Suggestions for future research that 
can address these limitations are also discussed in this section.  
Firstly, there are several methodological limitations that should be mentioned. The study 
includes only public firms that have had an analyst downgrade. This poses a self selection 
problem(Heckman 1979) as firms that have analysts downgrades may be different from those 
that do not. Also, I am examining only large firms that have enough size and resources to have 
gone public. However, public firms account for only less than one half of one percent of all 
corporations (Aldrich 1999) and may lead to serious bias. My theory is based on firms that are in 
deteriorating performance conditions and should be different from those that do not have 
performance downturn. Future research should investigate other conditions that impact downgrade, by 
adapting a two stage model to identify and delineate factors that affect analyst downgrade but not 
CEO dismissal. Also, the methodology chosen for the hazard model was to use an accelerated 
failure time model. As mentioned in chapter four the model was chosen for various reasons but 
mostly because it gives an accurate prediction of survival time. However, this means that I 
cannot employ time varying covariates. As such, my measures use averages across time or select 
a meaningful time point. My main variables are non-time varying covariates and present no 
problems. Board characteristics may pose a problem as the structure of corporate boards can 
change over time. This is true, however, staggered boards is a prominent practice in US 
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corporate law meaning that there cannot be a sudden drastic change in board composition 
lending to minimal effects the change in board composition can have on speed of CEO dismissal.   
Secondly, the effects of successor origin could have an effect on post-succession firm 
performance (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Zajac, 1990). Prior literature examined the effects of 
inside versus outside successors (Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Friedman & Singh, 1989, Furtado & 
Karan, 1990; Walsh & Seward, 1990 Shen & Cannella, 2002b). Allgood and Farrel (2003) use a 
match theory to suggest that good matches are characterized by better firm performance. 
Depending on the reason of poor performance the choice of an outsider vs. an insider would 
vary. Hofer and Schendel (Hofer, 1978) classify type of turnaround approach as “strategic” or 
“operating” and posits that the need for CEO change and the need for inside or outside 
succession may differ. Given these research gaps, examining how attribution variables affect the 
selection and fit in successor will be a likely extension.  
Finally, moderating effects were not accounted for in my model. Board characteristics 
and CEO power can affect the strength of the relationship of the attribution variables on speed of 
CEO dismissal. If the CEO has more power over the board, even if the board perceives and 
attributes the cause of downturn to the CEO, the boards may not be willing to dismiss the CEO. 
Other than CEO duality and board size, the direct effects were nonexistent. If no direct effect is 
present, tests of the moderator effect would have little meaning (James & Bret 1984). A larger 
sample and finer grained measure in future research can address this limitation.  
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
 
1. Please tell me a bit about your experience as a board member.  
2. Are the functions of a board different when the firm is doing poorly vs. good? 
a. Difference in when a company is doing well vs. not doing well?   
b. Where do you get first signal not going well?  
c. Can I speculate that those come as a surprise to the board? 
3. How often is the CEO monitored and evaluated? Is there a time in a CEO’s tenure in 
which s/he is more prone to being evaluated more attentively?   
Going back to analyst downgrade ratings. Let’s say it s a big corp. and you’re 
downgraded by an analyst and noon else does so what? 
 
4. How important is firm performance in evaluating the CEO? Specifically what aspects of 
performance do you consider?  
 
5. In your experience at IBM and other firms, when would boards raise the issue of 
replacing a CEO? Can you walk us through the CEO replacement decision?  
 
6. Do you know of any situations that have too quickly replaced or waited too long to 
replace a CEO? Do boards consider an optimal time in firing the CEO?  
 
7. Are corporate boards sensitive to analyst rating information?  
a. The driving question is.. the analyst downgrade. Is that ever a surprise to a board 
member?  
b. Going back to analyst downgrade ratings. Let’s say it s a big corp. and you’re 
downgraded by an analyst and noon else does so what? 
c. Do you think that’s changed in recent years?   
8. At IBM, you have experience hiring an insider and outsider. What was the difference and 
why did you make that decision? 
 
9. In your view, has the legal system such as the Sarbanes Oxley act improved corporate 
governance? Was there any impact? Why or why not?  
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